THE 1974 SPEAKERSHIP BATTLE
The black boy can’t count.[i]
Bob Moretti [after Willie Brown’s defeat in 1974]
For all its drama, the 1974 contest for Assembly speakership was quite possibly at one time the best and worst episode in the political life of Willie Brown. It was a painful loss, but because of it, he learned the importance of numbers.
He was also made to finely-tune the art of deal-making and to understand the consequences of failure. Where some would have accepted the resulting punishments as political death, Willie Brown endured, learned and put himself in place for yet another opportunity, years later.
As the curtain opened for Act I of the two-part drama [see Chapter 21 for Act II], he was young, and to many, brash—not at all the smooth, polished operator many came to perceive him to be in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet he was the brilliant chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, distinguishing himself as an astute legislator with great energy, knowledge and a quick wit. The speakership was a natural end.
When exactly he first seriously entertained the desire to become Assembly speaker is difficult to ascertain, but I did come across two stories having similar elements. The first was told to me by former legislator Mike Cullen, who was Willie Brown’s assembly seatmate for years.
In an interview, Mr. Cullen related to me that in 1968, as Mr. Brown was deeply enthralled telling one of his famous stories to assemblypersons Knox and Crown, that erstwhile session assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh approached and interrupted, saying, “Willie Brown, it’s a good thing you aren’t white, because if you were, you’d be Speaker!”
Mr. Cullen recalled that he saw the desire in Willie Brown’s eyes at that very moment, relating, “I wouldn’t be surprised if at that very moment Willie Brown said, “Well, by God, Why not?!”[ii] While the verbiage doesn’t exactly sound like something Willie would say, I’m certain Mr. Cullen summed up the spirit of the moment. The other story is recalled by writer Rian Malan in the April 1982 issue of California magazine:
Toward the end of the sixties, Brown delivered a particularly brilliant speech on the floor, and afterward Speaker Unruh drew him aside. “It’s a good thing you aren’t white,” Unruh rumbled benignly. “Why’s that?” Brown asked. “Because if you were,” Unruh said, “you’d own the place.”
Both stories suggest that circa 1968, four years after Willie Brown was elected to the California State legislature, Speaker Unruh recognized that he had the ability and the disposition to be assembly speaker. Such a compliment from a man as stalwart and respected as Jesse Unruh undoubtedly stirred the thirty-four-year-old Willie Brown to aspire for the speakership, if he was not already coveting it.
Mr. Unruh, though, was destined to leave the legislature for the inevitable shootout between him and Ronald Reagan, California’s Governor, in the 1970 state gubernatorial election. The assembly itself, however, after the 1968 presidential election [the narrow victory by Richard Nixon over Hubert Humphrey], became a Republican majority, and the speakership fell to former minority leader, Robert Monagan. Speaker Monagan, with a 41 to 39 Republican advantage in the assembly, was not destined to remain long, so Willie Brown and others were ready when, in 1970, the Democrats regained the advantage with a 43-37 margin.
His first public attempt for the speakership was in 1971, but he lost to Bob Moretti. Some say he failed because, lacking the finesse that later became his trademark, he tried to strong-arm members into voting for him. Speaker Moretti did, however, appoint Mr. Brown as chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee, a committee assigned to handle fiscal concerns, and among those, the State Budget.
Like his Democratic predecessor, though, Mr. Moretti forsook his speakership to run for Governor in 1974. If there was a provision in the assembly for passing the scepter of speakership, it would have passed from Bob Moretti to Willie Brown.
To this end, Speaker Moretti recommended Willie Brown for the job, and Willie Brown initially seemed to be a shoo-in for the position, but as assembly politics go, he would not simply assume the speakership unchallenged. Thus the struggle for leadership began.
THE PLAYERS
The challenger turned out to be another San Francisco Democrat, Leo McCarthy, who had in his political experience learned to be a more efficient operator than Willie Brown. Nowhere was this more obvious than it was in the attitudes of the two aspirants in the year leading up to the Democratic Caucus vote.
Where Willie Brown exuded confidence and levity, Leo McCarthy worked silently behind the scenes, eroding Mr. Brown’s position, playing on concerns members had about him, while constructing a coalition of his own. Where Willie Brown seemed to take the votes of the Black Caucus and Latino Caucus for granted, Leo McCarthy, a conservative Democrat, was meeting with them on a weekly basis to make deals that would secure votes. In the end it proved to be simple math, and Willie Brown lost by four votes in the Democratic Caucus.
In picking off members’ votes, Leo McCarthy employed a strategy that played on the ambition, concerns, prejudices, jealousies, and outside loyalties of the legislative membership. Emphasizing the difference between himself and Willie, he told reporters,
I don’t feel I have to be center stage in everything that goes on in the capitol.[iii]
Recalling the almost militant positions Willie Brown had taken during the sixties, some conservative members were worried that, as Speaker, Mr. Brown would take up some of these “extremely-left” causes at the expense of issues relating to their constituencies.
Other members were concerned that, because of his law practice, he might be spread too thin, that his law concerns might be in conflict with the duty he would have as Speaker, a duty to members. Still others were apprehensive about what they perceived as Willie Brown’s self-absorbed nature: the flamboyance, the clothes, the cars and the glamorous image. And finally, there was just outright prejudice.
The members involved might scoff at hearing it, but there were some who, as liberal as they claimed to be, were just not ready to vote a black man into the Assembly’s top position. Speaker Unruh understood the Assembly’s membership, and he was clearly alluding to members’ racial prejudices and discomfort when he suggested that Willie Brown would be much more successful as a white man.
These are the concerns and prejudices several former members suggested Leo McCarthy played on in order to get the required number of votes that made him Assembly Speaker. When the votes were tallied in the Democratic Caucus, Leo McCarthy counted four more votes than Willie Brown and went before the Assembly on June 27, 1974 with full Democratic Caucus support.
Within the Democratic Caucus, a body of 51 members, there were three voting blocs that figured prominently in the contest between Willie Brown and Leo McCarthy. The first of these was the Black Caucus, with six members: Bill Greene (D-Los Angeles), John J. Miller (D-Oakland), Leon Ralph (D-Los Angeles), Frank Holoman (D-Los Angeles), Julian Dixon (D-Los Angeles), and Willie L. Brown, Jr. (D-San Francisco). According to Lou Cannon of the Washington Post:
Brown sought the Assembly speakership in 1974 and lost, in part because he would not promise a key committee chairmanship to a black legislator whom he considered poorly qualified. Brown’s opponent [McCarthy] made the promise and won.[iv]
When, in late December, Leo McCarthy announced committee chairmanships and assignments, John Miller was named Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Bill Greene was named Chairman of the Labor Relations Committee, Julian Dixon became Chairman of the Public Employees and Retirement Committee, and Leon Ralph was chosen to head the Rules Committee. Frank Holoman had been a part of the speakership vote in June; he had been Brown’s sole supporter in the Black Caucus, but he retired before committees were assigned, and his successor, freshman assemblyman Curtis Tucker (D-Los Angeles) became Vice Chairman of the Elections and Reapportionment Committee.
Given the spirit of the rivalry between the two aspirants and Leo McCarthy’s speakership philosophy, it is not surprising that ten year incumbent Willie Brown was relieved of his chairmanship of the powerful Ways and Means Committee and assigned menial seats on three large committees [Human Resources (nine members), Transportation (fifteen members), and Urban Development and Housing (thirteen members)].
But who was this “black legislator,” at odds with Willie Brown with reference to a “key committee chairmanship” that Leo McCarthy awarded? Of the Chairmanships dispensed to Black Caucus members, the Judiciary Chairmanship and the Rules Chairmanship were the most key, so it might be supposed that the “black legislator” was either John Miller or Leon Ralph. Because the Caucus keeps no public record of individual votes, it had been impossible to substantiate who in the Caucus initially supported and who opposed Willie Brown, but there are many in Sacramento who vividly and specifically remember the dynamics of the time.
In interviews conducted with individuals associated with the 1974 speakership contest, it was generally suggested that this “black legislator” was John Miller, though he did not stand alone against Mr. Brown. During an interview, Alice Huffman, director of the California Teachers’ Association and President of Bay-PAC [Black Political Action Committee], recalled a conversation she had with Bill Green in 1975 after he had become a state senator.
At a reception for Governor Jerry Brown’s black appointees, she asked the senator why he and the other blacks in the assembly hadn’t supported Willie Brown. In Ms. Huffman words:
He unloaded on me. He had me in the corner for one hour telling me all the reasons why, but he was very, very defensive.[v]
Yet the actual, behind-the-scenes developments suggested far more encompassing dealings involving regional and personal loyalties. According to education lobbyist John Mockler, a former state senator, a former Willie Brown staffer, and a friend to Mr. Brown since 1959,
The speakership fight got involved with gubernatorial politics, it got involved with black, north/south power politics. Remember Merv Dymally was running for lieutenant governor—Merv got involved in this negative thing against Willie—he was worried about too many blacks having power. You know that old game—one’s enough… So Merv weighed in to cut a deal with Leo on money.[vi]
If indeed Mervyn Dymally saw a Willie Brown speakership as a threat to his position as the preeminent black in the state, he sought to derail the astute assemblyman’s bid in a place where he could yield his greatest influence, in the black caucus. His instrument, or agent within that group was a man who hated Willie Brown—John Miller—who would barter opposition to Mr. Brown for a key committee chairmanship. Ironically enough,
John Miller might not have ever been elected to the Assembly if not for Willie Brown, as Mr. Mockler recalled:
It’s interesting that before, John Miller—when he ran for the Assembly in Berkeley, he had a primary opponent named Otho Green—Otho Green was a very strong black man, and we went to Willie and said “you oughta back Otho, he’s a better candidate”. He [Willie Brown] said, “No, no.” Willie went way out. John Miller was nobody, and Willie Brown personally walked precincts, brought people over to get John Miller elected. A few years later…[vii]
A few years later, Mr. Miller, as one capitol observer put it, “was chopping at Willie Brown’s ankles at his every opportunity,”[viii] and it was Miller who nominated Leo McCarthy for speaker, but John Miller’s opposition and support for Mr. McCarthy apparently did not surprise many. The ill-will John Miller bore for Willie was well documented in several newspapers, including the San Francisco Chronicle, as set forth below,
It’s an open secret in Sacramento that there has been no love lost between Brown and Miller since 1970. In that year, Brown put Miller’s name forward as a compromise candidate for minority leader of the Assembly, when the Democratic caucus couldn’t agree on three announced candidates.[ix]
This incident happened immediately after former speaker Jesse Unruh left the minority leader post to run for Governor against Ronald Reagan. The Republicans held a one-vote edge in the Assembly, where Robert Monagan served as speaker.
The next year, the Democrats became the majority party, and Miller felt that as former minority leader he was entitled to be the Democrat’s choice for speaker. Brown got together a coalition and the Democrats elected Bob Moretti of Van Nuys as their speaker. Miller has never forgotten that. And, in the ways of politics, never forgave Brown[x].
Willie acknowledged the personal nature of the rift between himself and John Miller and spoke publicly on the matter, saying,
I don’t know… Miller has had some kind of permanent hate for me ever since then.[xi]
Miller, savoring the opportunity to get a shot at Willie, savoring the opportunity to deny Willie what had been denied him, explained his decision not to support Willie in this way,
Willie is brilliant at public relations, but while he’s talking about what can be done for minorities, we’ve been going around doing the things he’s talking about… The black caucus didn’t leave Willie—he left us.[xii]
In arguing his case before the Black Caucus, Willie urged the five other members,
This [is] the best—maybe the last chance we’ll ever have—to make a minority member speaker of the Assembly… [I have 23 votes.] Look, if you don’t want me, I’ll give my 23 votes to whatever assemblyman you want to name…[xiii]
He was in essence prepared to make one of the other members speaker or to cast the Black Caucus as swing votes—votes that could create a speakership—and swing votes could be bartered for power and position. It was no surprise that John Miller resisted, insisting the speaker’s campaign wasn’t a racial thing. What did surprise Willie, however, was the late defection of the other caucus blacks. Pressure brought on by John Miller and Mr. Dymally caused even a close friend to vote against Willie Brown.
For the first time, the personal betrayal of friends, and the kinda realization [of] ethnic-division politics, the jealousy [hurt him]… But Leon Ralph was a Merv Dymally protegee, and Merv pulled the chain. Leon cried when he told Willie he was going to vote the other way. Now John Miller he [Willie Brown] expected, but these guys were last-minute betrayals.[xiv]
On Monday, June 18, in a last-ditch effort to sway the caucus blacks to his side, Willie Brown held a rally on the Capitol steps appealing for outside interests to pressure pro-McCarthy blacks in the caucus.
Two blacks could either grant me the speakership or deny me the speakership… [My losing would cause] irreparable damage… to the black community of California.[xv]
Speaking in Brown’s behalf were Assemblyman Frank Holoman, Berkley Mayor Warren Widener, and San Francisco publisher Carlton Goodlet. In the subsequent “spinning” following the rally, a confident McCarthy predicted victory and called Willie’s tactic for targeting blacks, “obscene.”
Willie said he felt “optimistic” and suggested the possibility of the Republicans casting the deciding votes. After having served for three years in a stellar performance as Ways and Means Chairman, Willie’s most memorable passage from his speech on the Capitol steps included these words,
Willie Brown is abrasive. Willie Brown is arrogant. But there is nobody who can say Willie Brown doesn’t work harder than anyone. You cannot be against Willie Brown on the basis of performance.[xvi]
Needless to say, work ethic and performance mattered little where politics were concerned. In the end, Leo McCarthy got Black Caucus support, and Merv Dymally, as the first black in history to be elected lieutenant governor, maintained his preeminence. For him, according to Mr. Mockler, it was “partially pay-back [relating to differences between friends of Jess Unruh and friends of Phil Burton, as detailed in Chapter 7], partially to get some money to run for lieutenant governor, and partially “Who’s the biggest black leader?”[xvii]
The Latino Caucus was disproportionately small, relative to the number of Latinos in the state. There were four members: Peter Chacon (D-San Diego); Richard Allatore (D-Los Angeles, Ray Gonzales (D-Los Angeles) and Alex Garcia (D-Los Angeles). Mr. Chacon, who supported Leo McCarthy from the beginning, got the chairmanship of the Urban Development and Housing Committee and a seat on the Ways and Means Committee.
Richard Allatorre who, on the other hand, supported Willie Brown, was merely assigned seats on three committees [Elections, Labor, and Revenue and Taxation]. Three of the four members of the Latino Caucus were persuaded to support to McCarthy: Mr. Chacon, Mr. Garcia and Mr. Gonzales. Richard Alatorre was the sole member of the four member Latino Caucus who supported Willie Brown.
Yet perhaps the most serious and painful factor in the 1974 contest for speakership was Howard Berman’s defection over to Leo McCarthy. Central to the speakership in this defection: with Mr. Berman went no less than five Democratic Caucus members, a significant number, considering Willie Brown lost by four votes. In the same way that Mr. Brown had taken the minority caucuses for granted, he had been certain that freshman assemblyman and very close friend Howard Berman would deliver votes.
The relationship between Mr. Brown and Mr. Berman dated back to the mid-sixties with the California Young Democrats. The two had worked closely together, advancing the liberal causes of the group, causes that included opposition to the war in Viet Nam.
In 1972, when Mr. Berman was involved in a tight race for his assembly seat, Willie Brown had gone down to Los Angeles to lend support. They knew each other; they were friends. Nonetheless, in the Assembly, alliances were not made on the basis of friendship or history. Rather, consistent with politics, deals were struck on a quid pro quo basis: something for something.
Howard Berman had six votes in a caucus numbering fifty-one members—that was worth something. According to the San Francisco Chronicle,
A group of six Democrats who consider themselves “swing” votes met privately to pledge themselves to McCarthy.[xviii]
Friendship aside, Berman stood to get something in exchange for delivering those votes— especially if those votes could create a speakership. Willie Brown may have offered something in the way of a vice chairmanship, but Leo McCarthy, knowing how vital a role Mr. Berman’s votes could play, offered a plum, a prize, a fast-track to the top of the Assembly: he promised to name Howard Berman majority leader in exchange for the votes.
Howard Berman was in a position to deliver votes because he was an astute individual, but he was ambitious, a point that Leo McCarthy may not have carefully considered as he bartered for caucus votes. Mr. Berman, along with Congressman Henry Waxman and his brother Michael, would later run an organization called “the Waxman-Berman machine,” which had a potent political influence in southern California and statewide politics during the late 1970s and1980s.
Before coming to the California Assembly, Howard Berman had been a highly successful labor lawyer, who had the support and financial backing of the Los Angeles Jewish community and strategic political connections. With Mr. Waxman, a California assemblyman in 1974, he and brother Michael would continue to gain political influence, campaigning to elect “their” members to state and national legislatures.
In 1974 however, Howard Berman was only thirty-two and relatively inexperienced at political operating, though not so unskilled that he did not recognize a fast track to the top. Elected in 1972, he was still a freshman who would have to wait years behind more experienced and senior members for a choice chairmanship or a leadership position. Leo McCarthy played on Howard Berman’s ambition and won the speakership, keeping his promise to make Mr. Berman majority leader, not realizing this same ambition would undo his speakership.
The final group of players in the contest for the speakership was the twenty-nine members in the Republican Caucus. In the end, however, they had no impact on the election, as Willie Brown and Leo McCarthy, according to the long-held tradition that the majority party should choose the speaker without help from the minority party, came to an agreement that the winner of the Democratic caucus would take all.
According to some Republicans though, that agreement might not have been reached if Willie Brown had gotten their early support. Willie Brown, in contrast, told me that the Republicans could have played a role, “if they had been smart.” Initially, he did receive support from some members, but, according to Ken Maddy, a member of that 1974 caucus, in the end, Brown and Moretti had approached and dealt with the wrong set of Republicans:
Willie, Moretti, Murphy, myself, Deddeh and Fenton, and one or two other guys who are now deceased or gone, were all part of a Monday night poker game. I think what they [Willie Brown and Bob Moretti] counted on was a group of us Republicans who were all very close friends with them as being locked-in votes for Willie.[xix]
According to Mr. Maddy, Mr. Brown and Mr. Moretti promised that John Briggs would be the chairman of Agriculture Committee and other promises had been made, but that his [Ken Maddy’s] group—moderate Republicans, who should have been Willie Brown’s natural allies—had been slighted, taken for granted, promised nothing. He continued:
For whatever reason, we all sort of took umbrage at the idea that they were taking us for granted… The reality was that Jerry Lewis and I put together the Republicans who jumped ships and moved over to McCarthy, with no promises from McCarthy, basically, only that we would get a fair shot based on ability, that the members of our caucus who were the ones who worked hard would get a shot.[xx]
Frank Murphy, a Republican assemblyman and lobbyist who was Mr. Brown’s vice chairman on the Revenue and Taxation Committee and a member of the Monday night poker game, related a concurring assessment.
I think it was a tactical error on Mr. Brown’s part—the way in which he approached campaigning on this. He turned the task of dealing with Republicans over to two of his lieutenants who botched it, I think, and gave Mr. McCarthy an opportunity to approach Republicans as a group and offer to them—not necessarily concessions, but his personal assurances that their rights would be respected and their talents would be utilized, and I think he just made things more comfortable for Republicans than Mr. Brown did. Not because he and Mr. Brown wouldn’t be able to do the same things I’m sure, but just the way he went about letting Republicans know things[xxi].
With Republican support thus shifted, it was easier for Willie Brown to agree with Leo McCarthy with reference to discounting the Republican Caucus in the speakership vote. Senator Maddy recalled a disparity in perception, remarking,
Moretti, who I was quite close to, and Willie, who I always considered a good friend, were very upset with myself, and Jerry Lewis, and Bob Beverly, and all the guys who moved to McCarthy’s side, for the simple reason that they thought that we were double-crossing them. And our theory was that they had excluded us, they had given away too many favors.[xxii]
But it was 1974, a year that the Watergate scandal dominated national politics and Republicans suffered at the November polls.
We lost a substantial numbers of seats. We were reduced down to almost next to nothing… McCarthy came in and greeted us with the news when we got back– and I was one of the leaders, Lewis and I—Bob Beverly I think was going to become minority leader at that point in time. But in any event, [McCarthy] greeted us that there would be no Republican chairmanships at all.
Willie had promised like five or six to various people, so when we caucused on our first day back, and the question was McCarthy’s speakership, and he’d already put the word out to many of us that, “I’m sorry, but the only way I can consolidate my power among the Democrats is to take everything away from you guys ‘cause you’re down to such low numbers,”—we were down to 23 or so, the lowest number we had since 1898 or something, we had lost so many seats that year.
And like, Ray Sealy got promised to be Chairman of Agriculture. Sealy got beat that year, surprisingly. Anyway, Briggs and others who had been supporters of Willie really did a number on us who had supported Leo, and in caucus, absolutely lambasted us, and said, “This is what you’ve caused, we’ve absolutely zero power now, you know, at least we could have trusted Willie!”
And so our caucus then unanimously turned it around and went back to Willie and said you have our unanimous votes now for speaker. And so Willie ran it up the flagpole and tried to get enough votes in the Democratic caucus, and I guess what they had sworn to do between Leo and Willie was that whoever had the majority of votes in the Democratic caucus, they didn’t come to us and rely upon us, which they could have done.
I’m not sure how it all transpired, but anyway, the long and short of it is that we then unanimously voted for Willie, even those of us who had supported Leo, which then made it easier for Leo to dump all the crap on us for the rest of the year.[xxiii]
ELEVENTH HOUR
Bearing in mind that Bob Moretti was still speaker through much of the campaigning by Brown and McCarthy in June, he did his best to give friend Willie the best opportunity for the job. While running for Governor earlier in the year, he indicated he would step down as speaker after the primary. After losing to Edmund G. Brown, Jr. on June 4, Moretti was loath to give up the post unless he knew Willie had the votes to assume it. According to the San Francisco Chronicle,
Although McCarthy seems to have the votes for the job, Speaker Bob Moretti, a Brown backer, won’t give it up. And some of McCarthy’s supporters don’t want to oust Moretti, whom they figure already has suffered ego deflation through the loss of the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. So, the postponement will give Moretti time to exit gracefully, while McCarthy hopes to maintain his votes without some switching to Brown.[xxiv]
And yet, Moretti stalled purposely in order to give Willie the opportunity to win over votes, indicating he “wouldn’t voluntarily step down until he [felt] Brown could win.”[xxv] Finally however, on Thursday, June 13, McCarthy forced Moretti’s hand with an Assembly floor resolution that he [McCarthy] be elected speaker.
After a two-hour meeting, Moretti agreed to resign on a date to be announced within one week, setting the stage for the issue to be decided in the Democrat Caucus on the following Tuesday. Moretti’s decision spelled the end of the speaker’s campaign, which seemed to spell an end for Brown’s political career. Before leaving the two-hour meeting, Willie declared,
“I will survive! I will survive!” and then he burst abruptly from the room before the meeting ended. Brown brushed past newsmen, almost in tears, and flew to San Francisco to attend the graduation of a daughter from Herbert Hoover Junior High School.[xxvi]
On June 18, 1974, in a ninety-minute closed-door meeting of 48 of the 49 Democrats [John Quimby was absent, doing an eulogy for a friend], McCarthy won the vote for the speakership by a 26-to-22 margin. Later on June 27, in the full Assembly vote for Speaker, he lost by one vote.
In the aftermath, Brown’s friend Moretti cracked a painfully cynical joke. “The black boy can’t count. Willie laughed, but later he [Willie] and his senior aide, Rudy Nothenberg, cried on each other’s shoulders.[xxvii]
REFLECTION
For all players and observers involved, it is very easy to suggest, upon reflection, what should or should not have been done, but what is interesting about this indelible chapter in California history is the dynamics of it all; the historical context, usurping, ambition, jealousies, betrayals, political operating, and misunderstandings—all the stuff that makes for good theatre. Nonetheless, it was merely a preview for the most expensive and dramatic speakership contest staged in California history that would begin in late 1979. While I’ve taken a few pages to summarize what happened in 1974 and why, there is sufficient data write fifty more.
Historically, it is more important that Willie Brown learned from this best and worst episode in his political career, and indeed he did. He would have years to reflect on this battle in 1974, years to further fashion himself to become the longest-tenured most popular/most villainized speaker in California history. Senator Maddy, recalling the time, finished with this comment:
It was a strange year. Those were strange years, because Willie, I think, rarely has made errors around here in all the years that I’ve known him, tactical errors in terms of his leadership. But that was a major error that first year. I think to some degree he learned from it.[xxviii]
In the aftermath of it all, Willie’s final line was optimistic, prophetic, and perhaps tinged with a flickering hope.
There will be other days… and other battles… and other arenas.[xxix]
***************
Willie – The Man, the Myth and the Era
THE 1980 SPEAKERSHIP BATTLE
This is risky business. It probably won’t work, and it will be the most difficult time we will ever endure… Let’s try it![xxx]
– WILLIE BROWN
[Willie Brown to Mike Roos, Maxine Waters, Frank Vicencia, and Elihu Harris shortly before entering the 1980 contest for speaker]
By late 1979, Willie Brown had learned his numbers. The “black boy” from Texas could count better than anyone in the California Assembly, and he stunned the Legislature and the State by pulling off one of the greatest upsets in the history of the speakership.
The drama had begun in 1974 when Willie, Ways and Means Chairman and heir apparent to the speakership, had been outmaneuvered and outbidded for members’ votes in the Democrat Caucus by Leo McCarthy, who snatched the top leadership position and punished Willie by stripping him of his chairmanship, drastically reducing his staff and relegating him to a tiny office on the sixth floor of the Capitol – almost within an eyeshot of Ways and Means Committee room.
Speaker McCarthy’s victory happened largely because there had been some late defections prior to the Democrat Caucus vote that Willie Brown could not overcome. Among these defections was that of ambitious young assemblyman Howard Berman, who bartered the six very important Democrat Caucus votes he controlled for Mr. McCarthy’s promise to make him Majority Leader.
As the curtain rose in late1979 for Act II of the saga (see Chapter 15 for the prequel), Howard Berman had been serving in that capacity for five years, and he, along with brother Michael and Assemblyman Henry Waxman, had forged a political machine that had become strong in southern California. Together, they helped elect new members to the Assembly, members who would be loyal to their ends, which eventually included the speakership for Mr. Berman.
After a little over a year in the “Broom Closet,” a name assembly members use for that tiny sixth floor office near the Capitol cafeteria, Willie Brown came to terms with Leo McCarthy and was named Chairman of the Revenue and Taxation Committee. He wasn’t as powerful as he had been while overseeing Ways and Means, but he had put himself in a position to operate.
The Democrats still held the numerical advantage in the Assembly, 50-30, almost outnumbering Republicans two to one. Thus within the Democrat Caucus the magic number was twenty six – any candidate who could secure twenty-six pledges in a vote would be Speaker.
Once again, the stage was set for an exciting drama that would unfold, though unlike the relatively short and covert speakership contest of 1974, 1980’s bitter public leadership struggle lasted for almost a year.
The players were essentially the same: Leo McCarthy, the liberal San Francisco Democrat Speaker; liberal and ambitious Howard Berman, the power broker from Southern California; Willie Brown, the long-shot who was all but ignored until the end; the Black Caucus, with influences from Mervyn Dymally and other black leaders; the Latino Caucus, with pressure coming from labor and Cesar Chavez; and the Republicans who, according to tradition, were supposed to sit the battle out and hope for the best.
SCENE I:
AUDACES FORTUNA JUVA –
FORTUNE FAVORS THE BOLD
Democrat Jerry Brown had been elected Governor in 1974 and again in 1978, but he was clearly not going to seek that office in 1982, as he sought to challenge Jimmy Carter in the national democratic primaries of late 1979. All around the state, political pundits and forecasters speculated about who would replace him.
But just as it had been with Jess Unruh in 1968 and Bob Moretti in 1974, the lure of that white marble-faced office on the ground floor of the Capitol building seemed irresistible to Speaker Leo McCarthy. More than once in public he alluded to making a bid for the job, but then he also suggested he might be considering the U.S. Senate seat that would come up in 1982.
As many assembly members saw it, Speaker McCarthy would soon be on his way up or out, that the speakership was merely a steppingstone for him. To this end, the San Francisco Democrat had begun fund-raising efforts, as either statewide job would require vast amounts of campaign spending.
But 1980 was an election year, and assembly members in tough districts facing well-financed challengers began to worry that Speaker McCarthy was putting his ambition before their concerns. To many, it was the Speaker who, with state party resources and his enormous capacity for raising money, was responsible for preserving their seats and the majority. Seven Democrat seats had been lost in the 1978 election, and it seemed Republicans would make further gains in 1980.
Assembly Majority Leader Howard Berman was in an ideal position to hear and address members’ legitimate concerns about the coming elections as well as to test their attitudes about having a new leader in the house. The fact that he already had a potent political machine in place that raised hundreds of thousands of dollars and was responsible for at least six victories in one election further made him attractive to those who worried about their seats. Counting supporters quietly, Mr. Berman arrived at the magic number: twenty-six. He would have only to challenge his boss to become absolute master over the Assembly.
Nonetheless, a pretext would be necessary before such a challenge could be issued, an incident that would incite passion in the membership and provide a legitimate reason for a change in leadership. Carefully measuring his wary opponent, it wasn’t long before the majority leader from Los Angeles had his opportunity, as alluded to in the February 1981 issue of Los Angeles magazine.
It all came to a head at a December testimonial dinner when honoree McCarthy did the unthinkable. He neglected to introduce the other Assembly members present. Enraged, they turned to Berman and urged him to topple McCarthy immediately, thus beginning the bitter, year-long battle for the speakership.[xxxi]
Soon after that dinner, possibly on the very next day, as the Democrat Central Committee had held a fund-raiser at the Firehouse Restaurant in Sacramento, on December 9, Howard Berman, confident that he had sufficient backers to support his challenge, phoned Speaker McCarthy and asked him to step down. He added that, as newly elected speaker, he would appoint Leo McCarthy Majority Leader, which ironically enough, was the same prize Leo had offered him for his cooperation in the1974 speakership contest.
The phone call and a subsequent meeting happened on December 10, 1979[xxxii], and the challenge drew a quick response from Speaker McCarthy, who refused to yield his high-profile leadership post and redoubled his efforts at pleasing his supporters and satisfying his membership. But the gauntlet had been thrown down, and the major upheaval in the Assembly that would occur in the following months to come was inevitable.
The phone call and meeting were merely the result of and the culmination of fears and frustrations, some genuinely felt, some inflamed by Mr. Berman, which existed in the Democrat membership. Tensions had run high even in September, before the legislature recessed, as members raised legitimate questions concerning leadership, only to be threatened by the speaker.
Many of the members were in Sacramento in early December for that very reason – to meet on leadership. The appeal by some to Howard Berman – that he should challenge the speaker – reflected the feelings of a substantial portion of the membership. But Howard Berman was not simply doing the will of those who believed in him and wanted a change in leadership – he had wanted the job all along.
SCENE II:
AD FINEM – TO THE END
In the week that followed, after lengthy December meetings that Leo McCarthy had with Howard Berman, a more responsive Speaker McCarthy went to the membership in order to determine the veracity of his former Majority Leader’s (Howard Berman had resigned the post to challenge the speaker) assertion to have had twenty-six locked-in votes.
The claim was tenuous at best, and Mr. McCarthy, making phone calls and speaking with members, began the process of securing pledges from Democrats who would continue to support his speakership. When he had finally procured twenty-six, he proclaimed himself victorious, hoping to quell the coup, and at a press conference at 5:25 p.m., on December 17, with Willie Brown at his side, he released the names of the members who had promised to vote for him.
The reader must bear in mind that these machinations were occurring while the Legislature was on break, with some conversations and promises made largely by phone. Reassured his majority support in the Democrat Caucus, Speaker McCarthy asked Mr. Berman to concede, but the challenge of the west Los Angeles assemblyman could not be dismissed so easily.
Because counting was such a priority, I have made an attempt to reconstruct the actual numbers game, though, in all the time that has passed, and for the fact that both aspirants were perhaps overly-optimistic in order to influence momentum, a name or two might be erroneously listed. According to Leo McCarthy at his press conference convened at the Capitol, his twenty-six pledges came from:
1) Agnos of San Francisco;
2) Alatorre of Los Angeles;
3) Boatwright of Concord;
4) Bosco of Occidental;
5) W. Brown of San Francisco;
6) Calvo of Mountain View;
7) Deddeh of Chula Vista;
8) Fenton of Montebello;
9) Gage of Napa;
10) Greene of Sacramento;
11) Hannigan of Fairfield;
12) Harris of Oakland;
13) Knox of Richmond;
14) Mangers of Huntington Beach;
15) McAllister of San Jose;
16) McCarthy of San Francisco;
17) Mello of Watsonville;
18) Mori of Pleasanton;
19) Papan of Millbrae;
20) Roos of Los Angeles;
21) Tanner of El Monte;
22) Torres of Los Angeles;
23) Vasconcelles of San Jose;
24) Vicencia of Bellflower;
25) M. Waters of Los Angeles; and
26) Wray of Westminster.
Ironically enough, since numbers were the concern, the number six returned. In 1974, Howard Berman had six votes to wager in the Caucus, and those votes shifted from Willie Brown to Leo McCarthy, essentially making McCarthy speaker. In 1979, however, it was Willie Brown who had six votes to wager, among those the pledges of Mike Roos and Elihu Harris, and those six votes made Mr. Berman’s quest for the speakership exceedingly difficult.
Howard Berman’s response to the press conference and call for concession was a challenge to McCarthy’s numbers. He further accused the speaker of playing a con to get pledges from members, suggesting that by claiming to have majority support, McCarthy was attempting to shift momentum and win votes of uncertain and undecided members, who did not want to end up on the losing side of a speakership battle.
While Berman worked behind the scenes, trying to lock in the votes of the undecided, one of his top lieutenants, Richard Robinson of Santa Ana, challenged three of the names on McCarthy’s list. He said:
1) Assembly member Gage, who was campaigning for Governor Brown for the New Hampshire primaries, was uncommitted;
2) Assembly member Deddeh had given a firm commitment to Berman; and
3) Assembly member Wray had been misled about the vote count and was undecided[xxxiii].
Robinson’s claims, if true, would reduce McCarthy’s number to twenty-three, three votes short of the majority, but the date was December 17. The numbers would mean nothing until January 7, when the legislature reconvened, and an official vote could be taken. In the meantime, the game of politics and political operating would assume its highest form, as both speaker and challenger fought the battle in whispers within private quarters and in public outcries as detailed in the media.
Throughout the initial challenge and the days that followed, Howard Berman was invariably portrayed as a power-hungry ingrate who was betraying the very man who had given him his position as Majority Leader.[xxxiv]
In an attempt to influence public opinion to the contrary, Berman submitted to an interview on December 19, in which he stated reasons for his action. He said that at least part of his motivation for the challenge was the feeling of being deceived by McCarthy.
The speaker assured me in July that he was prepared to take certain steps that would facilitate my chances of being speaker when he stepped down. And then within a month, he backed out of those assurances… I felt betrayed. I felt that a game was being played on me.[xxxv]
Leo McCarthy did not disagree. He admitted that he said he would step down at some time and “leave the speakership available for Howard, because of his position as majority leader” and that he would “indicate to my friends that I have strong, favorable feelings for Howard becoming speaker.” This was not at issue. The issue was timing. Howard Berman wanted to become speaker in 1980, but Leo wanted to play his options to the end, as Howard detailed.
In the last few months, Leo began to tell me that while his current intention is to run for a statewide office in 1982, he plans to reassess his position in ‘81. And he said that if he changed his mind about running, he’d want to continue as speaker in 1983-84… I’m unwilling to accept that.[xxxvi]
Of course, Berman’s claim of such a perceived betrayal was too tenuous a grounds for a change in state democratic leadership, so in the interview, he carefully laid the foundation for undermining McCarthy’s support and extended that perceived sense of betrayal and subsequent indignation to the concerns of Democrat Party.
I was very instrumental in getting him elected speaker… Leo did reward me for my efforts by making me Majority Leader. He was grateful; I was grateful. That’s an alliance. But lately I feel that he’s forgetting my agenda and the Democratic Party’s agenda to serve his own agency. And that’s why I’m left with a sense of being betrayed.[xxxvii]
Having established a link in this betrayal to the state Democratic Party, he could offer specific criticism in a rightfully concerned manner and advance his own cause for becoming speaker.
He cannot have this personal future agenda and still conduct the governance of California as speaker. Leo is too spread out. By concentrating on his own future, he’s lost his effectiveness as speaker, and this is causing a split among some Assembly Democrats… That’s why when we finally had our long meeting, I told him that I should become speaker and he could take the lead on any issues he wanted – that in effect we’d switch roles.[xxxviii]
Finally, in citing his principal reason for the coup, Howard Berman intimated that, in light of recent Democrat losses in elections, the party needed an effective, focused speaker who could keep the Republicans from gaining the majority in coming election, saying, “the way things were going, we’re courting political disaster in 1980 and in the decade beyond, after reapportionment.”[xxxix]
The suggestion is that he was forced, by concern for the state and the party, to challenge his friend and boss for the greater good. Not that he loved Leo McCarthy any less, but that he loved the Democratic Party more.
In any event, Howard Berman’s measured response – his refusal to concede, the challenge to three of the names on McCarthy’s list and his portrayal of himself as a victim of a broken promise and McCarthy an egoist who had lost his effectiveness and forgotten his party and membership – this strategy seemed to have worked.
Though the operating and posturing dragged on through the holidays, it seemed that by New Year’s Day, 1980, Berman had established momentum and had secured at least twenty-six Caucus votes. On December 31, McCarthy received a letter from probably the last undecided member, Leona Egeland of Morgan Hill, who expressed that she would support Berman, and assembly member Bates of Oakland, the only other uncommitted vote, had expressed the same hours before.
But what of McCarthy’s list of twenty-six committed pledges? Had he been misleading by representing members promises of support? No. His list of committed votes had been solid under fire, solid until forces outside the legislature began to influence events. Never before had outside interests been so involved in the direction of leadership in California’s lower house.
Under pressure from Cesar Chavez who, in that rare instance, had aligned himself with an old adversary, the Western Growers’ Association, the two Latino members from Los Angeles who had pledged support to McCarthy fell from the list, leaving him only twenty-four votes. On December 26, Art Torres and Richard Alatorre had switched allegiances, going over to Berman’s side.
Sensing his own defeat, McCarthy had desperately campaigned for the votes of Egeland and Bates, but to no avail. The numbers were inescapable. Unless Leo McCarthy could change either two hard-won committed votes or the ground rules themselves, it seemed that Howard Berman would usurp his speakership.
SCENE III:
OMNEM MOVERE LAPIDEM –
NO STONE LEFT UNTURNED
Committed votes are not won over easily, and it was at Berman’s urging of Cesar Chavez and his following that the Latino leader brought the pressure to bear on Assemblypersons Alatorre and Torres, so that they switched allegiances. One of the strengths of the Waxman-Berman political machine was its ability to influence through selective mailing, its ability to target a segment of voters, to fashion a message with a unique appeal to the group, and to get that message into the hands of that specific segment.
With capable brother Michael Berman largely responsible for this sophisticated, computerized mailing, it was remarkably effective. Nonetheless, there were allegations by McCarthy that Howard Berman was playing dirty politics through the mail, and he distributed as an example an anti-McCarthy fundraising solicitation sent out to growers by a group calling itself, “Californians to Save Agriculture.”
The solicitation, which possibly went out to as many as eight thousand homes and businesses, urged growers to “dump McCarthy” in favor of “someone who would be fair to our [the agricultural] industry.”[xl] Because the message was clearly anti-McCarthy and the group was not registered with the Secretary of State, McCarthy suggested that it originated in the enemy camp.
Berman flatly denied it, of course, hinting that it was perhaps McCarthy’s backers who had produced the mailer in an effort to make the Berman campaign and its methods appear unethical. Thus with allegations cast by both camps and with clandestine meeting and dealing, this battle between the powers of California pressed on, though victory for Berman seemed certain.
The first few days of January passed quickly, as McCarthy and his supporters in the caucus scrambled to get at least one additional vote – in the event of a 25-25 tie, he could retain the speakership, according to caucus rules. No one budged.
But what about the Black Caucus with its six members? Where did it stand? It didn’t. It sat split evenly down the middle, rendering it ineffectual. Unless it voted as a united bloc according to a pre-determined agenda, responsive to the concerns of black legislators and the black community, it was utterly useless.
On the McCarthy side were Willie Brown of San Francisco, Elihu Harris of Oakland, and Maxine Waters from Los Angeles. Berman had the balance with the other three southern California blacks, Teresa Hughes, Gwen Moore, and Curtis Tucker. There wasn’t much time, as the Democrats would caucus on January 7, so due to the efforts Willie Brown and Maxine Waters, a meeting of black leaders was convened in Los Angeles on Saturday the 5th to discuss the division in the black caucus.
Over sixty prominent members of the black community attended, including Bishop Hartford Brookens, the leader of the African Methodist Episcopal Church for the Western states, who chaired the meeting. Also present were former Lt. Governor Mervyn Dymally, Los Angeles City Councilman Dave Cunningham, Los Angeles Urban League Director John Mack, Minister Thomas Kilgore, State College Trustee Willie Stennis, and a host of others who called for unity in the caucus behind Leo McCarthy for reasons best expressed by Chairman Brookens to the press.
The unity of the black community is at stake… This is not an anti-Berman move, but for the solidarity of the black community. It carries an obvious sense of concern about how they (the black legislators) are doing their job. We expect our political leadership to respond to the black community agenda even over their own personal agenda. We would rather see Willie Brown as speaker than either of the others, and this is his greater chance (keeping McCarthy in the office for 1980) since he will step down in 1982.[xli]
By that time, there was no doubt that even Leo McCarthy would rather have seen Willie Brown as speaker than Howard Berman. Nonetheless, the meeting produced a delegation of five individuals (Mr. Brookens, Mr. Dymally, Mr. Kilgore, and two members of the Avalon Community Carver center, Dr. George Locke and Mary Henry), who would visit assembly members Hughes, Moore, and Tucker, in order to persuade the three to back McCarthy.
The meeting understandably, made Berman nervous, but he had prominent blacks working in his interest to offset the influence of the delegation. Mervyn Dymally was said to have delivered to Berman the vote of Teresa Hughes, his former aide, and Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, who did not attend the meeting, phoned each of the three and later assured Henry Waxman that no Berman votes would change. Not one vote did change, and the Black Caucus, which could have bartered its six votes for some consideration or concession, was set to get nothing.
To the contrary, a loss of influence and position was more likely. Maxine Waters served as Majority Whip for McCarthy, a key appointment she was likely to lose to Richard Alatorre if Berman became speaker. Notwithstanding the conflict, McCarthy had named Willie Brown Majority Leader in Berman’s place. Instead of acting in a manner consistent with the actual purpose of a caucus, the six black votes, being split, had the effect of canceling each other. For all intents and purposes, there was no Black Caucus in early1980.
It is important, however, that the concerns and voting rationales of the pro-Berman members of that Black Caucus be considered fairly. For the caucus members who did not vote for Willie Brown as Speaker in 1980 and the ones who supported McCarthy instead in 1974 – some of these members said they believed it was important and even necessary for the caucus to vote together on concerns important to blacks in California, but that the issue of the speakership was an entirely separate question.
Candidates for the speakership spend much time and effort negotiating for votes by promising chairmanships, posts, and inclusion. With both candidates, who were aptly qualified for the job, members voted according to which aspirant offered the best deal. For these members, Willie’s being black was irrelevant, and they wouldn’t support him simply for his African American heritage. What mattered to them were their individual agendas. In 1974, Leon Ralph supported McCarthy because Leo had promised to make him Rules Committee chairman, while Willie had not.
One member suggested to me that in 1980, Howard Berman would have made Gwen Moore Majority Whip. Whether or not the notion that the speakership should be considered separately from other Black Caucus issues is debatable. It does seem though, that the interest of the caucus as a whole, and by extension, the interests of blacks in the state of California, should outweigh the separate interests of its individual members.
On Sunday night the 6th, both sides met in Sacramento in preparation for the Democrat Caucus meeting set for 10 a.m. Monday morning. The McCarthy people assembled over at the D.O. Mills restaurant on K Street in Old Sacramento while the Berman supporters set up camp at the Mansion Inn on 16th Street.
No doubt the same subject was being discussed in both locations: McCarthy’s final options, one of which involved the inclusion of Assembly Republicans. Practicality and tradition however, stood in the way. It was simply not sensible for a speaker to owe his position to the support of the opposition party, and then, custom held that such inclusion just didn’t happen.
Nevertheless, there had been an established precedent for such a deviation from standard practice. Forty years earlier, on January 29 of 1940, Assemblyman Paul Peek unseated Speaker Gordon Garland and took his job by prevailing upon the minority Republicans for support. With the numerical advantage in the caucus, Howard Berman called on Leo McCarthy to honor party tradition and suggested at least once publicly that he had an assurance from his rival that the Republicans, waiting in the wings, would play no role in the drama.[xlii]
McCarthy quickly denied making any such promise to Berman, speaking through his press aide, Howard Gingold, who asserted, “I think he (McCarthy) has said all along that it takes 41 votes to win the speakership.”[xliii] Forty-one votes was the rule, and a literal adherence to that rule was the option it seemed Leo McCarthy and his supporters would play.
SCENE IV:
DE JURE – BY THE RULE
As expected by both sides, Leo McCarthy lost the Democrat Caucus vote to Howard Berman 26-24. Traditionally, the loser and supporters had fallen in line and united behind the individual with the majority of caucus support, but this contest itself had been irregular in nature. It was not often that a speaker was challenged by a member of his own party mid-term in the speakership.
As for McCarthy, he had been elected by the majority (at least 41 members) of the eighty-member California State Assembly to serve a two-year term as speaker and he wasn’t willing to let twenty-six members of a caucus deny him his right to serve in that capacity. After unsuccessful negotiations, he and supporters flatly refused to back Berman, which would leave the challenger fifteen votes short in a speakership vote before the assembly.
Still, Berman forces called for an assembly vote to test the strength of his opponent’s support. During floor session, Richard Robinson moved to vacate the chair, a motion that required forty-one votes to pass. McCarthy’s support held firm, except for that of Mike Gage, who explained that he voted in favor of the motion because he believed in “majority rule.”
Thus the motion got twenty-seven “aye” votes. Only two Democrats, John Vasconcellos and Chet Wray voted “no,” as the remainder abstained at the request of Majority Leader, Willie Brown. The Republicans, gleefully reveling at this infighting among Democrats, also abstained, refusing for the moment to take part in the battle. The issue unresolved, Leo McCarthy would remain speaker. He clearly had the right to do so.
I’m the incumbent speaker… I’m the elected speaker for two years (1979-80). I’ve got 23 Democrats that feel very strongly I should complete my two-year term.[xliv]
That they felt “very strongly” was an understatement. By then, both sides were entrenched and animosity showed through in speech and in action during caucus and on the floor. The battle was on. To the victor would go the spoils; to the loser, banishment.
Berman had been successful however, in displacing McCarthy’s top lieutenant, Art Agnos, and installing himself as Democrat Caucus chairman. From this post, he sought to win the support of McCarthy supporters through careful negotiation, but with little success. At one point, his supporters offered a plan for creating the office of “President of the Assembly” for McCarthy, whose sole authority would have rested in assigning bills to committee. The proposal was turned down.
Other plans and concessions were offered, but McCarthy, with the solid support of twenty-three Democrats, was required to make no deal in order to remain speaker. Soon after Berman displaced Agnos, McCarthy displaced Robinson, Berman’s top man, by removing him from key committee assignments. Willie Brown insisted however, that Robinson and others had to be displaced not in retaliation, but because they had indicated they would not cooperate with the speaker on legislation.
Still, Robinson continued to move “to vacate the office of speaker,” but to no effect, as the results remained the same. McCarthy’s supporters were in place to begin taking care of the business of the assembly and the Republicans were studying the scene. They knew that, in some way, they would benefit from the conflict. Howard Berman, deprived of a prize he had labored for that still lingered, just beyond his grasp, knew the Republicans were licking their chops, and offered this:
A Democratic speaker deprived of his own party’s support must rely on the consent of the minority to stay in power. This provides the Republicans the potential for mischief or coercion, either subtle or explicit.[xlv]
On Monday of the next week, Berman admitted that his supporters were trying to strike a deal with Republicans to oust McCarthy. It was a carefully constructed deal that involved a rule change, so that Berman would not injure himself politically in an election year. With many tough primaries to be fought in southern California in April and in May, Berman did not want to be the speaker elected by and beholden to Republicans. He didn’t want the Assembly’s thirty Republicans to ultimately decide in the battle between himself and Leo McCarthy.
Instead, he wanted the Republicans to agree to a new rule that would give the majority caucus the sole say in who was to be speaker of the Assembly. In exchange, he offered that the minority caucus would control a limited number of committee chairmanships, and that the caucus would name the Republican members of all committees. Republican Assembly Minority Leader Carol Hallet of Atascadero, however, was ready to make no deals. Other Republicans suggested that the minority party would probably become involved when the time was right, when the situation could be milked for all it was worth. Besides that, many Republicans questioned Berman’s character and didn’t trust him.
“Howard was the sort of guy,” says Republican assemblyman Ross Johnson of Fullerton, “who’d look you right in the eye and say, ‘I know I told you I’d do X, but circumstances have changed.’” [xlvi]
While some questioned his character, many Republican members from the Los Angeles area feared his potent political machine in operation down South. Those members preferred a speaker from northern California and paled at the thought of the Waxman-Berman machine enhanced by the power of the speakership.
The divisiveness among Democrats, though, certainly helped their re-election chances. Nevertheless, after the Berman camp had played its hand, it seemed the Republicans would continue the course of abstention and non-involvement. That being the case, and because Democrats on both sides had taken such fixed positions, Leo McCarthy could remain as speaker until the next election in November. Foiled but not despairing, a hopeful Howard Berman remarked:
It’s very important for us to keep demonstrating that the majority wants a change… It is naive and futile for Leo to believe he can carry on without the support of the majority of the caucus. I find a growing awareness among supporters of Leo that that is the case.[xlvii]
Whatever “growing awareness” Berman found never amounted to a change in support, and the assembly eventually got past the speakership dispute and took up the business of lawmaking. Howard Berman eventually realized that he had lost for the moment. Both Berman and McCarthy knew however, that perhaps even more important than the general election in November, the next battleground would be the June primaries.
SCENE V:
BELLUM INTERNECINUM –
WAR OF EXTERMINATION
By early-May, the stages and sets for the smaller battles resounded with cries and well-financed appeals for the votes of the local peoples, but the two Democrat generals, McCarthy and Berman, with camps respectively in San Francisco and Los Angeles, were engaged in the larger war, which would ultimately end in stalemate.
Both opponents had broken the unwritten rule in the Assembly – that no Democrat contender should bring forth candidates to challenge Democratic incumbents. Incumbent seats were to be left alone, so that the contest should have been for the five seats being vacated by Democrats and for contests for the Republican seats in weak districts.
In order to recreate that scene from April and May of 1980, I pulled more than two dozen articles from the period in various newspapers including the San Francisco Chronicle, the Los Angeles Times, and the Sacramento Bee. From those articles I arrived at the following:
In total, there were thirteen key contests involving McCarthy and Berman, relating to the speakership race. Of the thirteen, there was
A) 1 battle to replace a retiring Republican;
B) 1 battle to displace an incumbent Republican;
C) 2 uncontested challenges to replace incumbent Republicans;
D) 2 uncontested challenges to replace retiring Democrats;
E) 3 battles to replace retiring Democrats; and
F) 4 battles to displace incumbent Democrats.
A) Battle to replace a retiring Republican
District 3: Butte, Colousa, Nevada, Sierra, Sutter, and Yuba Counties
Republican incumbent Gene Chappie, retiring to run for Congress;
McCarthy candidate and money: Sutter County Supervisor George Garcia, $49,553
Berman candidate and money: Placer County Supervisor Alex Feriera, $23,000
Winner: McCarthy
B) Battle to displace an incumbent Republican
District 51: Los Angeles County
Republican incumbent Gerald Felando, in perceivably weak district;
McCarthy candidate and money: Businessman John Barbieri, not listed by FPPC
$55,000 to Louis Dominguez;
Berman candidate and money: Marketing Executive Louis Dominguez[xlviii], unknown
Winner: Berman
C) 2 uncontested challenges to replace incumbent Republicans
1) District 39: Los Angeles County
Republican incumbent Bob Hays, in perceivably weak district;
Berman candidate and money: Businessman Richard Katz, $19,500
Beneficiary: Berman
2) District 58: Los Angeles, Orange Counties
Republican incumbent Dennis Brown, in perceivably weak district;
Berman candidate and money: Lawyer John Allen, not listed
Beneficiary: Berman
D) 2 uncontested challenges to replace retiring Democrats
1) District 15: Alameda, Contra Costa Counties
Democratic incumbent Dan Boatwright, running for state senate;
McCarthy candidate and money: Contra Costa Co. Supervisor Eric Hasseltine, N/A
Beneficiary: McCarthy
2) District 24: Santa Clara County
Democratic incumbent Leona Egeland, retiring;
McCarthy candidate and money: Santa Clara Co. Super. Dominic Cortese, $5,557
Beneficiary: McCarthy
E) 3 battles to replace retiring Democrats
1) District 11: Contra Costa County
Democratic Speaker Pro Tem Jack Knox, retiring;
McCarthy candidate and money: Businessman Nello Bianco, $24,854
Berman candidate and money: Richmond City Councilman Robert Campbell, $29,000
Winner: Berman
2) District 28: Monterey, Santa Cruz Counties
Democratic incumbent Henry Mello, retiring to run for state senate;
McCarthy candidate and money: Mello aide Kevin LeGraff, $47,304
Berman candidate and money: Monterey County Supervisor Sam Farr, $42,750
Winner: Berman
3) District 66: San Bernardino County
Democratic incumbent Bill McVittie, retiring;
McCarthy candidate and money: Business executive Ken Willis, $24,752
Berman candidate and money: San Bernadino D.A. Jim Cramer, $22,500
Winner: Berman
In total, Howard Berman outspent Leo McCarthy by over 2 to 1, infusing $319,000 in various campaigns, compared to his opponent’s $153,000. At a grand total of $472,000, it was the most expensive primary contest in the history of California. A record was also established as, according to Secretary of State March Fong Eu, 7.4 million voters showed up at state polls for this particular primary.
The bitterest battles, however, were fought in districts where either Leo McCarthy or Howard Berman sought to displace an incumbent Democrat. If it was a terrible thing to do, then Howard Berman out-terribled Leo McCarthy 3 to 1. These particular contests were perhaps the most painful and the most damaging to the Democrat party. The injuries persisted for some time. In all, there were four of these ugly and expensive battles.
F) 4 battles to displace incumbent Democrats
1) District 6: Sacramento County
McCarthy candidate and money: Incumbent Bill Greene, $19,817
Berman candidate and money: Scientist Joan Reiss, $60,5000
Winner: McCarthy
2) District 12: Alameda, Contra Costa Counties
McCarthy candidate and money: Incumbent Floyd Mori, $5,503
Berman candidate and money: Alameda Co. Supervisor Charles Santana, $35,000
Winner: McCarthy
3) District 26: San Joaquin County
McCarthy candidate and money: Former Garamendi aide Patrick Johnston, $12,721
Berman candidate and money: Incumbent Carmen Perino, $38,050
Winner: McCarthy
4) District 59: Los Angeles County
McCarthy candidate and money: Incumbent Jack Fenton, $7,553
Berman candidate and money: Monterey Park City Councilman Marty Martinez, $49,000
Winner: Berman
The disregard for the unwritten rule, that incumbent Democrats should be left alone, was the source of resentment from northern California Democrats and further served to drive a wedge between supporters of McCarthy and Berman. Perhaps the most significant was the defeat of Jack Fenton, who had been part of that famous Monday night poker game that Ken Maddy described in Chapter 15.
According to Sacramento lore, Democrats felt that they could not live with Berman because of what he did to former Monterey Park assemblyman Jack Fenton, a McCarthy supporter. He was also, insiders say, a poker buddy of Berman’s, and Berman had assured him that he would not go into his district. But Fenton woke up one morning and found himself with a primary opponent supported by the Berman operation. The opponent, Matthew Martinez, also happened to be a Chicano, and there was little Fenton could do except clean out his desk.[xlix]
While Berman contented that McCarthy had done the same thing up north to incumbent Carmen Perino of Stockton, there was no question that he had done it to a greater degree. Then again, Perino and McCarthy hadn’t been poker buddies.
Of the thirteen key primary battles, McCarthy won six and Berman won seven, a near dead heat, as two of Berman’s candidates would be running against incumbent Republicans in November. Both camps, however, proclaimed victory and continued to spin and posture throughout the long summer. The candidates would still have to win in the general election, and that meant continued campaigning and further spending.
The November elections and resulting new blood promised to change the make-up of the Democratic caucus, but because of the nature of the bitter and expensive war, the members of that caucus would remain strongly and completely polarized. The Republicans, seeing the Democrats so sharply divided on the speakership issue, hoped to use the disunity so publicly displayed to pick up seats in vulnerable districts.
With Ronald Reagan ahead of President Jimmy Carter in the polls and a general sense of disenchantment with Democrats throughout the country due to economic concerns, they knew they would be gaining seats, but there was no telling how many. Thus minority leader Carol Hallet of Atascadero would make no deal until after an assessment in the wake of the general election.
Voters went to the polls on November 4, 1980. The big news was that former California Governor Ronald Reagan had defeated incumbent U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Republicans, riding Mr. Reagan’s coattails, made gains all over the country, most significantly in capturing the Oval Office and the Senate, but they also made dramatic gains in the U.S. House of Representatives, defeating four California Democrat incumbents in the November election.
Their net gain in the California Assembly was three seats so that there were 33 Republicans and 47 Democrats. Leo McCarthy fared poorly at the polls, electing only two of the eleven individuals he supported, law professor Byron Sher (not listed earlier because he did not get McCarthy money and was only indirectly linked to the speaker) in District 21 and Dominic Cortese.
Howard Berman did much better, electing six: Campbell, Cramer, Farr, Floyd, Katz, and Martinez. Thus it seemed that at last Berman, with 25 supporters in the 47 member Democratic caucus, had won conclusively and could be absolute master over the State Legislature.
On the day after the election, McCarthy supporters met to discuss terms of surrender. Their leader, in the wake of the meeting, abdicated the legislature’s top job, indicating he was no longer a candidate, conceding, “I want to see the issue of leadership in the house resolved in the Democratic caucus.”[l] Berman was quick to concur and offer incentive for McCarthy backers to succumb.
It seems to me the Democrats have an obligation to stick together as a caucus and I have a burden to demonstrate that a house organized under my leadership is not one where a winner’s justice is imposed. My pledge is that I do not intend to punish people based on their political conduct.[li]
Mr. Berman’s pledge, however, meant nothing to many McCarthy backers, who didn’t trust him, and others who bore resentment for the fact he had gone after incumbent Democrats. Assemblyman Art Agnos (D-San Francisco) would later speak a line, saying that the McCarthy supporters were all ready to surrender, “but Howard Berman never gave us the opportunity for honor.”[lii]
Nonetheless, four caucus members, Willie Brown, Maxine Waters, Mike Roos, and Frank Vicencia were designated to meet with Berman to discuss terms of an agreement. These four however, were not ready to agree to any kind of surrender and together they hatched a dangerous and ambitious plan to ultimately snatch the speakership away from Howard Berman’s tenuous grasp.
SCENE VI:
CARPE DIEM! – SEIZE THE DAY!
If the Republicans were ever going to get any consideration at all out of the tortuous and protracted speakership dispute, the time had come for them to play their hand. If Berman became speaker, the majority of committee chairmanships would have gone to his allies and the remainder to McCarthy backers as terms of an agreement between the two camps.
But if another candidate, a compromise candidate, was inclined to seek and capture the legislature’s top job, owing to Republican support, specific terms could be discussed. Willie Brown knew this. He knew that if he announced a challenge to Howard Berman’s claim to the speakership, the Republicans would offer support and try to bargain a deal. He was their only hope for significant inclusion and they, in turn, could make him speaker.
On Wednesday, November 19, Willie Brown made it known publicly that he was pursuing the job, backed by a coalition of both Republicans and Democrats. He and Frank Vicencia had met the week before with minority leader Carol Hallet, and it seemed a deal had been struck. According to a Republican source, in exchange for support, Willie Brown agreed to the following terms at that meeting:
1) Honor an agreement Leo McCarthy had made with Republicans to divide funds for designing reapportionment plans equally between the two parties;
2) Maintain Republican staffing with no cutbacks.
There were however, as everyone remembers, other stipulations that were detailed later, but this was the beginning of Willie Brown’s negotiations with Carol Hallet and the Republican Party, who promised him they would make no attempt to challenge his speakership for two years. As talks continued, Howard Berman and indeed the entire Democratic Party in California grew nervous about the short- and long-range ramifications of having a potential speaker essentially elected by and conjunct with Republicans.
But Willie Brown knew, just as Julius Caesar knew when he crossed the Rubicon, “the die had been cast.” He could not relent in his scheme, as his political life and the political lives of Maxine Waters, Mike Roos, Frank Vicencia and other entrenched McCarthy supporters were at stake.
Still there was the issue of the Democrat caucus. Howard Berman, Democratic Governor Jerry Brown, and even Leo McCarthy had made public statements suggesting that the speakership issue should be decided by the caucus vote.
The day after the election, the numbers were Berman – 25, McCarthy – 22. The initial presumption had been that, since Berman had the majority of the caucus, Willie Brown could not possibly win without the help of the Republicans. Following from that premise, Howard Berman went out after Republican support himself, claiming at one time to have nine pledges,[liii] but it quickly became obvious that the Republicans, led by Hallet, were engaged in an anti-Berman campaign. Hallet claimed she was uncomfortable with Howard Berman’s ties to the United Farm Workers.
Thus redirecting, Berman appealed to the propriety of the long-held tradition that the majority caucus should decide the issue. In light of his perceived advantage in that caucus, he and shell-shocked California Democrat congressmen urged members to oppose Willie Brown’s attempt to take over the speakership, warning that Republican inclusion would adversely affect reapportionment, and that the state Democrat party would suffer if GOP members helped draw congressional districts in 1981.
Governor Jerry Brown did not indicate which candidate for speaker he preferred, but he suggested in strong wording, issued by aide Gray Davis, that the contest should be decided by Democrats alone.[liv]
Uncertain what Willie Brown would do, Berman next offered a deal, which promised eight committee chairmanships to McCarthy/ Brown backers in addition to four second-level leadership jobs: assistant speaker pro tem, caucus secretary, a seat on the rules committee, and “Democrat Policy Chairman.” The latter was a new position concerned with formulation and articulation of Berman’s proposed legislative program.
It is worth noting that the offer was not made directly to Willie Brown, but it was aimed at the members who backed him, in order to erode his support in the caucus. However, when Willie Brown demanded of him clarification in terms of a specified list of members’ assignments, Berman was loath to commit to such a request and the caucus count remained at Berman – 26, Brown – 20.
Thus Willie Brown faced the disconsolate dilemma of whether or not to proceed with Republican support if and when Berman won the majority of the Democratic caucus. Reflecting on the statement he made, which was listed at the very beginning of the chapter, the pressure brought to bear by friends, the Democratic Party, and fellow members was great, and it was one of the most difficult times he had endured.
Then the unexpected happened. Howard Berman’s support began to cave just enough to give Willie the validation and position he needed. In the final two weeks before the vote, Art Torres and Richard Alatorre switched sides, deciding to back Brown and changing the count to Berman – 24, Brown – 22 with one hold-out – Tom Hannigan, a former McCarthy supporter who had decided to remain neutral. Then on Monday, November 24, Berman received a midnight call from Curtis Tucker informing him that, due to pressure from outside sources, he had decided to back Brown.
That left things dead even at 23 – 23, with one on the fence. A tie meant that the bitterly divided Democratic caucus could not decide which candidate would be speaker, leaving that determination to be made by the balance of Assembly members, namely the 33 Republicans.
But if the Republicans were to play such an important role in the speakership battle, just what were they going to get in return for their deciding votes? Just what was the deal? Berman wanted to know, and he suggested that Brown had:
1) Offered the Republican delegation in the House of Representatives a “special role” in reapportionment of congressional districts;
2) Committed to passage of a redistricting bill that would not offend the Republican minority in the Assembly;
3) Agreed to deny campaign help to Democratic nominees who were to challenge Republican incumbents who supported him for speaker.[lv]
The compact between Brown and Hallet had been sealed in mid-November, but neither would comment on specifics of the deal, making it difficult for outsiders to unravel.
Finally realizing that Brown had successfully split the Democrat caucus and held an overwhelming numerical advantage among Republicans with 28 pledges, Berman considered a final option – a compromise candidate of his own in hopes of splitting Republican votes. He selected more conservative Richard Lehman (D-Fresno), hoping to appeal to the GOP, but Carol Hallet and supporters held firm with Willie. After all, she had described him as “honest and a man of great integrity.”[lvi]
By Thanksgiving on Thursday, November 27, it seemed that the fate of the speakership had been sealed, and both sides anxiously awaited the convening of the 1981-82 legislature on Monday, December 1, which would end the bitter year-long battle.
The day came and the split Democratic caucus met before the session to decide a course of action. There was a motion to stick to the tradition that the majority party should choose the Speaker without any help from the minority, in which case neutral Tom Hannigan would be forced to commit, but he abstained from voting and the motion was defeated. He commented,
It became obvious to me, based on the content of the debate and those who spoke, that it was going to fall down on Brown-Berman sides. I saw it as posturing. I just thought it was not designed to get us together.[lvii]
His abstention was essentially a vote in itself in an all-important issue as it sealed the fate of the speakership. In the chamber, the session opened. After roll call by county and a swearing in of all members, Chief Clerk Charles E. Greene announced the next order of business was the nomination and election of officers of the Assembly for the 1981-82 Regular Session of the Legislature.
According to assembly rules, “there shall be no other business, motion, or resolution considered before the election” of the office of speaker and other offices. Finally, and at last, the issue would come to a vote. The following comes from the Chief Clerk’s record of the day:
1) A resolution was offered by Assemblywoman Teresa Hughes, nominating Howard L. Berman to be Speaker of the Assembly. The nomination was seconded by Assemblyman Peter Chacon;
2) The session was briefly interrupted by a committee from the Senate, who informed that the Senate was ready to proceed with the regular business of the Legislature;
3) Assemblyman John Vasconcellos nominated Willie L. Brown, Jr., for the Office of Speaker. Symbolic of the coalition, the nomination was seconded by Assemblywoman Carol Hallet and Assemblymen Curtis Tucker, John Thurman, and Art Torres;
4) The Chief Clerk declared nominations for Speaker closed;
5) Roll was called, and Willie Brown was elected Speaker with 51 votes, 10 more that were required.
The following is a breakdown of the voting:
Democrats for Brown: Agnos, Alatorre, Bosco, W. Brown, Cortese, Deddeh, Greene, Harris, McAlister, McCarthy, Papan, Roos, Sher, Tanner, Thurman, Torres, Tucker, Vasconcellos, Vicencia, M. Waters, N. Waters, Wray, and Young. Total: 23
Republicans for Brown: Baker, D. Brown, Duffy, Felando, Filante, Fondse, Frazee, Frizzelle, Hallet, Herger, Imbrecht, Ivers, Johnson, Kelley, Konnyu, LaFollette, Lancaster, Lewis, Marguth, Mountjoy, Naylor, Nolan, Rogers, Sebastiani, Statham, L. Stirling, Wright, and Wyman. Total: 28
These fifty-one individuals created the life of Willie Brown’s speakership, a seemingly feeble life that would grow powerful and endure longer than any speakership in the history of California. The balance either voted for Berman or did not commit.
Democrats for Berman: Bane, Bates, Berman, Campbell, Chacon, Costa, Cramer, Elder, Farr, Floyd, Goggin, Hart, Hughes, Ingalls, Kapiloff, Katz, Lehman, Levine, Lockyer, Martinez, Moore, Robinson, and Rosenthal. Total: 23
Republicans for Berman: Moorhead. Total: 1
Abstaining: Bergeson-R, Hannigan-D, Leonard-R, Ryan-R, and Stirling-R. Total: 5
It was certainly one of the highest points in the life of Willie Brown, perhaps his greatest triumph. His bright smile lit the entire Assembly chamber. There were cries of jubilation and celebration on Willie’s side, but there were tears from a few of the defeated. They had fought the battle so well for so long only to have Willie Brown steal the glory that was theirs.
In a sense, the wheel had come full circle – it was Howard Berman’s defection to McCarthy in 1974 that had cost Willie the speakership and the ensuing punishment, and here in 1980, Willie Brown had returned to reclaim that loss… at Howard Berman’s expense.
In the end though, Howard Berman and Leo McCarthy had spent $2.3 million in this battle for the speakership, while Willie Brown only spent $40,000. “And most of it,” he joked, “on clothes!”[lviii]
Perhaps a friend, John Vasconcellos, said it best.
In some ways, it’s poetic justice that the beneficiary of the most expensive speakership battle in California history turned out to be that skinny black kid from humble origins in Texas.[lix]
Willie Brown was escorted to the bar of the Assembly by Assemblymen Vasconcellos, Tucker, Thurman, Torres, and Assemblywoman Hallet. The oath of office was administered by a dear old friend and former law partner, the Honorable John Dearman, Judge of the Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco. The oath was as follows:
I, Willie L. Brown, Jr., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter.[lx]
At exactly 1:10 p.m. on December 1, 1980, Willie Brown became Speaker of the Assembly. As Speaker, he then introduced his wife, Blanche, and his son, Michael. After comments and the elections of other officers, the California Assembly went about its business with forty-six-year-old Willie Brown at the gavel.
At his first Capitol press conference as Speaker, he said his legislative priorities would be the improvement of public education and air pollution control. Thus he had, like the phoenix of ancient Arabian lore, risen from the ashes of the 1974 defeat to a glorious victory in 1980. The rest, as we have come to know it, is California history.
***************
Willie – The Man, the Myth and the Era
“THE WILLIE BROWN SHOW”
“The old white boys got taken fair and square.”
“Speaker Emeritus” Willie Brown, to Republican Doris Allen on June 5, 1995, immediately after passing her the speakership
On a quiet Sunday night in January 1994, as Willie Brown sat on a barstool in Frank Fat’s reflecting on his life, he told me he had never planned things out, that his actions were determined largely by what he wanted and his understanding of events as they unfolded. Now this to me was enigmatic if not unbelievable, though I did not comment as such. After all, I considered myself knowledgeable on the Speaker’s life and the era of California politics in which he served.
I knew the events, players, and factors involved twenty years earlier when he lost the speakership bid to Leo McCarthy. Similarly, I knew how this seemingly defeated man had risen again through the ranks to serve a turn on Howard Berman, who had betrayed him, snatching the speakership from its would-be heir only after making a deal with Assembly Republicans.
I knew how he had out-planned and out-smarted enemies on both sides of the aisle, at times escaping political death by the narrowest of margins. I knew how he had gone out and defeated statewide measures on welfare and campaign reform, proffered by Governor Pete Wilson and Attorney General John Van de Kamp respectively.
For him to suggest that these events and the rest of his life “just happened” seemed incredulous, but I remained silent, because I knew there was some key to understanding just what he meant by saying the major events in his life had been unplanned. And yet, it wasn’t until a year and some months later that I would finally begin to understand how Willie Brown was capable of pulling off elaborate undertakings with little definite planning.
ACT I
I met Assemblyman Paul Horcher of Diamond Bar in February 1992, as I was conducting interviews for the book and asked him if he was inclined to discuss Willie Brown with me, but he immediately declined. A year later he asked me if I still wanted to talk, and we set a couple of dates, which ultimately did not work out.
It wasn’t until March 1994 that we finally sat down. By this time, I knew that Mr. Horcher was out of favor with Assembly Republicans because he had accepted Vice-Chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee over the objections of Republican leader Jim Brulte of Rancho Cucamonga. Brulte wanted Willie to appoint Republican Dean Andal as Vice-Chairman of the powerful committee, but Willie had differed, as Andal was outspoken in his opposition and dislike for the Speaker. According to Willie,
When they did to Horcher what they did – a censure resolution at the state (Republican) central committee because he had accepted an appointment as vice chair of Ways and Means – they wanted Dean Andal from Stockton, a man who’s vilified Willie Brown all his life… He wasn’t just neutral. He did 27 different hit pieces on me. There was no way I could in good conscience, let alone psychologically, appoint Dean Andal to anything.[lxi]
Horcher had, on the other hand, cast the deciding vote in the 1991 budget, impressing Willie as a Member who voted and acted independent of party leadership. Further, Paul Horcher was friendly with the Trial Lawyers Association, a group very close to Willie, much to the dismay of fellow Republicans. Yet even before the appointment as Vice-Chairman of Ways and Means, I gathered through disparaging comments from Members that he was not well liked by many in the Republican caucus.
As we sat, Horcher seemed apprehensive about my recording device and suggested we do the interview off-record, as merely an interview for background. After the hour-long discussion concluded, I understood how precarious his position was: he was a Republican ostracized by his party, whose political future hinged on the goodwill of the Republican’s greatest foe, Willie Brown. Alienated from his own party leadership, he had cautiously turned to the smartest and most experienced Assembly Member for advice.
The acceptance of Willie’s appointment made Horcher the Assembly’s first true “independent,” though he kept the Republican name for the time. The slights and mistreatment from the caucus only made that point clearer, and so about two months later, Paul Horcher went to fellow Texan and fellow lawyer Willie Brown to say he wanted to be “independent” in name.
Now this was circa May 1994 and Willie, serving as pragmatic advisor, plainly informed Mr. Horcher that he would not be re-elected as an independent. According to political editor John Jacobs of the Sacramento Bee, Willie went so far as to say, “If you want to get back at the Republicans, get re-elected first.”[lxii]
This would suggest that beyond being re-elected and serving his district as an independent, Paul Horcher had an ax to grind. Injured, frustrated and embittered by his caucus and its leader for the way he had been treated, he wanted to hurt them. Willie advised him on how he could best serve his ends and let him go. There was no planning involved.
In May 1994 all indications suggested that the Democrats would have a safe majority after the November elections, so Willie wasn’t counting on Horcher’s support. He did, however, possess intelligence of Horcher’s hate for Republican leadership and kept it to himself.
“Intelligence” by definition is “the faculty of understanding” and “the power of perceiving, knowing, and reasoning.” After carefully considering all the events that transpired between November 8, 1994 and June 5, 1995, I concluded that Willie Brown had succeeded in the California Assembly and in life itself not through scrupulous planning, but by acquiring knowledge, understanding it and implications within specific contexts, reasoning on how he might best benefit from it, and acting when action must be taken.
Above all, Willie as Speaker always understood people and situations better than anyone else did. Through the course of events that followed the November 8th election, I will demonstrate how Willie Brown was more successful through intelligence than Jim Brulte and others were in their careful planning.
ET TU, BRULTE!
He was the last of a long line of would-be deposers of Willie Brown, which included Robert Naylor, Ross Johnson, Pat Nolan and Bill Jones. On November 8, 1995, he was in an enviable position, with “Caesar” seriously wounded and ready to fall “at the foot of the pedestal on which Pompey’s statue stood,” but Brulte missed, and he would miss in several elaborately planned but literally “unintelligent” attempts.
James L. Brulte was born on April 13, 1956, in Glencove, New York. Interestingly enough, at the time, Willie Brown was twenty-two years old and ready for law school, certainly old enough to be his father. The Brulte family moved to southern California in 1960. By the time eighteen year-old Jim had finished high school and joined the California Air National Guard, Willie had been elected, had risen and had fallen, displaced by new Speaker McCarthy as Ways and Means Chairman to the tiny sixth-floor office next to the Capitol cafeteria, learning the political lessons gained from such experiences.
Yet young Jim Brulte started in politics younger than most, walking precincts for Republicans at ten years old and working for Ronald Reagan’s campaigns as a young man. His Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science came from California State Poly University in Pomona.
In 1990 at the age of thirty-four, he won election to the California Assembly, part of the first class of members who would serve no longer than six years as a result of term-limits. Two years later, he was named Minority Leader, replacing Bill Jones. Careful Democrats regarded him as a skilled, smart and capable leader; and yet by virtue of his youth and inexperience, he was never regarded as a formidable foe for their leader, Willie.
But 1994, however, was a landmark year. Nationally and statewide, there was a marked shift to the right. In Washington, Republicans would take over the House of Representatives and the Senate, and a rippling effect would be felt in the states. By late summer, it became evident that November elections would be affected by a growing conservative trend. According to Willie, “None of us had ever seen anything like it. Leads of seven-to-eight points began to dwindle by the hour.”
Sensing the growing trend, an astute Jim Brulte showed incredible intelligence by understanding the potential benefit and acting when action was appropriate. In mid-October he borrowed over a million dollars and infused the money into selected campaigns where Democratic leads were shrinking or marginal and managed to stun Willie Brown and the Democratic Party with a major upset: 41 Republicans to 39 Democrats.
Not in 24 years had there been a Republican majority in the Assembly, and yet on the morning of November 9, as absentee ballots were counted in close races, it seemed inevitable. On that morning, a “frankly dumbfounded” Willie Brown and the rest of the Democrats began to look at Republican Jim Brulte in a different light.
Going into the election, not even consummate strategist Brulte had expected to do so well. With 41 Republican votes in the Assembly, the speakership was certainly his to lose.
THE PROLOGUE BEGINS…
After getting over the initial shock, Willie Brown no doubt reflected on his earlier meeting with the Republican-spurned Paul Horcher, who was re-elected by Whittier/West Covina/La Habra Heights voters in the Los Angeles area. It was Willie, after all, who had given him vice-chairmanship of one of the Assembly’s most powerful committees, and Mr. Horcher needed little reminding that it was Jim Brulte and the Assembly Republican leadership who had castigated and ostracized him. Comfortable with the result of the discussion, Willie proclaimed publicly that while he did not have 41 votes to be elected speaker, neither did Brulte, and that it would take 41 votes to displace him.
At the same time, Jim Brulte was reflecting on his relationship with the disaffected Republican caucus member and sought a way to mend deep and old wounds. With Governor Pete Wilson’s help, a plan was devised so that Jim Brulte could win the speakership while at the same time Paul Horcher would be brought back into the Republican fold.
In this scenario, Mr. Horcher would suggest to Willie Brown that he could count on unfailing support. Then on December 5, during the floor vote for speaker, Horcher would seem to be deliberating and would pass on the first call. This would set up a dramatic call to Horcher on the Assembly floor by the Governor himself. After speaking with the Governor, Paul Horcher would “do the right thing” and betray Willie, casting the 41st vote for Brulte, making him Speaker, and thus Mr. Horcher would become the hero of the day.
This well-conceived plan failed for a few reasons:
1) The reward was meaningless
Casting the deciding vote for Brulte may have brought Paul Horcher back into the Republican caucus, but it did not undo the perceived injustices he had felt, and it would not ultimately change the attitudes of many Members who had been disrespecting him for years. Paul Horcher wanted a judgeship in exchange for his vote, which Wilson could have given him as a reward. Nonetheless, Assembly caucus Republicans told me the governor was loath to reward a Republican member for “doing the right thing.”
2) The offer seemed disingenuous
Even after proposing the scenario to Horcher, Brulte actively sought Democratic votes. If Brulte had truly trusted Horcher, there was no need to court the Democrats. Thus Horcher did not trust Brulte. If Brulte had gotten a single Democrat to defect, then the Paul Horcher/hero-of-the-day scenario would have disappeared on the Assembly Floor and his vote either for or against Brulte would have meant nothing and would have gained him nothing. In late December, there was an unsubstantiated rumor suggesting Jim Brulte, just before going onto the Assembly floor on December 5, told Horcher, “I’ve got Democrat votes. I don’t need you.”
3) Paul Horcher felt he had little to lose
Weeks before the December 5 Assembly floor vote, several Republican caucus members had papers drawn up for a “Recall Horcher” campaign and presented them to him, warning that they would seek a recall if he didn’t “do the right thing.” He ultimately realized that he would never be accepted in the Republican caucus and would not have any significant role in the Assembly with Brulte as speaker. If Willie Brown remained however, Willie would owe Horcher and would reward accordingly. If a recall was pursued, Horcher felt he had a reasonable chance of surviving, and even if he didn’t, term limits would have forced him out of the Assembly in 1996 anyway.
Thus it was, when asked by Jim Brulte and Governor Pete Wilson in mid-November on what he would do in the floor vote on December 5, Horcher replied, “I’ll do the right thing.”
SPECIAL SESSION RESOLUTION
In November 1994, Willie Brown won his sixteenth election to the Assembly. He had been in California’s Lower House since November 1964 – 30 years. As the body’s senior Member, he was the most experienced and knowledgeable on the often-complicated rules relating to procedure.
When he called the outgoing Assembly Members to a special session on November 17, the Republicans were dubious about his possible motive. Yet in the outgoing Assembly, Republicans were in the minority. During the special session, Willie sought and won approval of a resolution, which would assure payment for operations and staffers in the event of a tie and deadlock on the speakership when the vote was taken December 5.
Republicans wondered what he had planned, but as he indicated, there was no plan. He merely acted to keep the Assembly functional in the event of a tie, and according to his knowledge and understanding, such a tie was likely if not inescapable.
COURTIN DEMOCRATS
On the eve before the December 5 speakership vote, both Republican Senator Ken Maddy and a newly elected Republican Assembly member Howard Kalloogian of Carlsbad separately predicted to me that Jim Brulte would win as speaker and that he would get three or four Democrat votes. Obviously, such defection did not happen the following morning, but it is noteworthy that such a number of Democrats had been in serious discussion with the Republican leader. There were rumors involving some of the members, but for two Democrats, Mike Machado of Linden and Dominic Cortese of San Jose, there is some substantiation.
Mike Machado, former President of the San Joaquin Farm Bureau and Former Vice-Chairman of the Tri Valley Growers Association, had in the course of winning a close election suggested he would vote independently and would not be the instrument of Democratic leadership or an automatic vote for Willie Brown.
Conservative Republican Dean Andal of Stockton, who had vacated his place in the Assembly to run for the State Board of Equalization, formerly held the seat Machado won. Because the Assembly election had been close, Republicans targeted Machado as a Democrat who they believed could be coerced into defection. When he voted for Brown in December and subsequently in February, a recall effort was launched, and according to most accounts, it would be fought hard on both sides.
Another Democrat, Joe Baca of San Bernadino, said Brulte had asked for his support over lunch but was unwilling to involve him significantly in the proposed new administration.
Dominic Cortese, on the other hand, was an all-together different matter. Regarded as the disaffected Democrat with a political ax to grind against Willie Brown, Cortese was actually inclined to vote for Jim Brulte until just minutes before the session convened.
Yet, hoping to be a Democratic Senator one day, he would not cast the deciding vote, he would not be the single Democrat who dumped Willie and elected a Republican to the speakership. While he was willing to add to the margin of victory, he would not decide the contest.
His dissatisfaction with Willie related to non-protection of a friend and fellow Assembly Member by Brown in the 1990 reapportionment. On Monday morning December 5, he asked Mr. Brulte if he had the needed 41 votes, to which Brulte said, “I’ve got them. I’ve got them locked up.” Mr. Cortese next asked if Mr. Brulte had secured Paul Horcher’s vote and Brulte responded, “Absolutely.”[lxiii]
If Mr. Cortese’s memory was not in error about such a conversation that morning, then there are two distinct conclusions that can be drawn about the Republican Leader:
1) Jim Brulte was dishonest or inaccurate with potential Democrat supporters
If the Assemblyman from Rancho Cucamonga truly knew Paul Horcher was going to vote for Willie Brown and told Dominic Cortese a lie to get his vote – “Cortese,” after all, came before “Horcher” in the roll call—then the dishonestly would be apparent. In support of such an assertion, several Democrats related that Mr. Brulte, when seeking their support, falsely indicated he had the votes of three or four other Democratic members.
When asked to name the members, the Republican leader was unable. Assemblyman Sal Canella of Ceres said he heard rumors that Brulte had mentioned him as a supporter, at the same time assuring Democrats he had no intention of defecting. Uncertain of Brulte’s claim that morning, Dominic Cortese asked him to produce Paul Horcher to confirm such a pledge, but without result.
Willie Brown, on the other hand, arranged a meeting between Cortese and Horcher in which it was confirmed that the estranged Republican was no definite vote for Brulte. The sequel followed on the Assembly floor.
2) Jim Brulte did not know how to count; he simply did not know where Horcher stood; he lacked the ability to shore up support
If the latter proved to be the case, then Jim Brulte was guilty of nothing other than inexperience. He had been in leadership for merely two years, had been in the Assembly for only four. He was still learning, but his opponent was an experienced, battle-tested professional. Giving Brulte the benefit of the doubt, perhaps he told Dominic Cortese he had Horcher because he actually believed he did.
When Paul Horcher said he would “do the right thing,” perhaps the Republican leader, overly optimistic, thought the statement indicated he had the vote locked up. Perhaps that was enough for Brulte, but it would not have been enough for Willie who, having been burned himself in 1974, always hedged his bets. Unless Brulte knew unequivocally where Paul Horcher stood, the vote was not locked. In this scenario, Paul Horcher’s support was taken for granted, and it was this miscalculation, perhaps as much as Paul Horcher himself, that cost Jim Brulte the speakership.
And why was Jim Brulte so sure about Paul Horcher’s vote? Certainly, some of the confidence came as a result of the explicit recall threat put to the estranged Republican. But as Willie’s career as Speaker and history has shown, threats are a less effective persuader in establishing institutions than are inclusion and accommodation. In his dealings throughout, Mr. Brulte and conservative lieutenants preferred recall threats and intimidation, which isolated individuals, to dialogue and incorporation, which established trust and leadership.
THE ASSEMBLY CHIEF CLERK
I first met E. Dotson Wilson during the summer of 1990, when he was serving as Deputy Chief of Staff for Assembly Speaker Willie Brown. After presenting the proposal for the book to Mr. Brown in July, Mr. Wilson interviewed me in his office for possible job opportunities, but I suggested I was more interested in, with Willie’s cooperation, writing the book than working for the Speaker’s office. Dotson Wilson impressed me as a very capable, professional and cautious man, careful not to make any representation for Willie. “The Speaker,” he asserted, “makes all his own decisions.”
Dotson Wilson came to the Capitol in 1979 as one of twelve Assembly Fellows chosen from a field of several hundred. He was a UCLA graduate who had received his Juris Doctorate from Hastings College of Law in San Francisco in May of that same year. No doubt owing to his knowledge and affability, he quickly advanced himself, becoming Policy Consultant, a special assistant to newly elected Assembly Speaker Willie Brown.
Four years later, he became Floor Manager to the Speaker and other Members and staff of the Democratic and Republican leadership. In 1988 he became Speaker Brown’s Deputy Chief of Staff and served in that capacity until Willie appointed him Chief Clerk and Parliamentarian for the California Assembly in 1992. In December 1994, it seemed the Chief Clerk would be responsible for one or more “key” rulings.
According to the rules of the California Assembly, Government Code Section 9023, “there shall be no other business, motion or resolution considered before the election of Speaker, save and except a motion to adjourn or a motion for a call of the house.” New members were to be sworn in on the morning of December 5, 1994 and immediately after, 41 Republicans and 39 Democrats would take up the matter of the speakership vote.
Until such issue might be determined, Dotson Wilson, Chief Clerk of the Assembly, would preside over the body, rendering all decisions. The times and circumstances had assured Mr. Wilson a place in California legislative history, but not without incredible stress. The Assembly Clerk, after all, owed his position and place in part to Willie Brown who had, despite the objections of Republicans, “given him the job.” Thus many Democrats expected him to “toe the company line,” to rule favorably for Democrats on floor matters that morning.
The Republicans were concerned he might do exactly that and pressured him not to ignore their interests and long-established Assembly rules. He had after all, been elected Assembly Chief Clerk the second time around by unanimous consent. While many rumors ran in Capitol circles during that time, the most popular was one involving a threat to Mr. Wilson. According to the stories, Republicans warned him that if Dotson Wilson, as Assembly Clerk, appeared to favor Willie Brown in any way, then he would be the subject of a special investigation initiated by Republican State Attorney General Dan Lungren.
On the other side, rumors suggested Mr. Wilson was being grilled and rehearsed by Willie Brown’s attorneys. There is some substantiation that he met with both sides to hear concerns, but he was loath to comment on the rumors or specific subject matter in these meetings.
THE DEMOCRAT LIBRETTO
There is an old axiom in law that asserts, “If the facts are against you, argue the law; if the law is against you, then argue the facts.” The most considerable fact was that the Democrats were outnumbered in the Assembly 41-39. Thus Willie Brown assigned five trusted Members of the Democratic Caucus to deliberate with his lawyers on how the numbers might be changed.
This delegation included Byron Sher, a law professor, Phil Isenberg, a very talented lawyer, member Louis Caldera, also an attorney, and two of the Assembly’s most experienced legislators, attorneys John Burton and John Vasconcelles.
The focus of discussion was the unseating of Republican Assemblyman Richard Mountjoy of Arcadia. It was a new question, and yet in the era of term limits, it was one that would certainly have relevance as Assembly Members looked increasingly toward the Senate for extension of their political lives.
Mr. Mountjoy had been elected as Senator in California’s 31st senatorial district in a special election on November 8. He replaced Republican Frank Hill, who had reluctantly resigned his seat after criminal convictions and impending incarceration. On the very same day of the senatorial election, Mountjoy was also re-elected to his own Assembly seat.
Clearly, Mr. Mountjoy preferred the Senate seat, but he indicated publicly that he would remain in the Assembly long enough to unseat Speaker Willie Brown before moving to the upper house. Considering Democrat options were limited, the delegation returned to Willie, unanimously recommending that Richard Mountjoy should be disqualified as an Assembly Member because he had been elected as a Senator.
If the Democrats could get Mr. Mountjoy disqualified on December 5, the Republican advantage would shrink to 40-39. If after such disqualification a disaffected Paul Horcher abstained from voting for Brulte as he had indicated at one time, the result would be a 39-39 tie. In the event of such a tie, there would be no speaker until a majority decided otherwise. In such case, Willie Brown, the Assembly’s most senior Member, would preside over the body.
Law Professor Byron Sher was chosen to introduce the matter on the floor. One thing however was for sure: even if Democrats were successful at disqualifying Richard Mountjoy, the Republicans would certainly have a majority by June 6, 1995, after a special election to fill the vacant seat. Thus the Democrats began to look for a compromise candidate.
THE REPUBLICAN SCRIPT
The Republicans insisted on “business as usual.” In every other speakership contest in memory, the party with the majority in the Assembly had elected the Speaker. There were concerns about the possible prejudice of the Assembly Chief Clerk, who had worked for and who was appointed by Willie Brown, and these concerns were addressed to Mr. Wilson, but the
Republicans planned to make Jim Brulte master of the Assembly in short order. They demanded a strict adherence to Government Section 9023, which stated that “there shall be no other business, motion, or resolution considered before the election” of the office of Speaker.
Jim Brulte expected unanimous support from Assembly Republicans, making him the first Republican Speaker in twenty-five years. Beyond that, he had pledges from more than one Democrat that, if it appeared that he would get 41 Republican votes on the floor, a few Democrats might be inclined to come over, adding to his margin of victory. This is why Republicans were predicting that Brulte would get 43 or 44 votes.
The Democrats who considered supporting the Republican aspirant were apprehensive because Brulte, throughout November and up to Sunday, December 4, never had 41 solid Republican votes, and Willie was quick to remind them of that fact. They waited for James Brulte to “lock-in” the 41st vote by cutting some deal with Paul Horcher, but it never happened.
Therein Mr. Brulte made his first major error: as a leader, as a man who would be master of California’s Assembly. He should have done what was necessary to “lock-in” the votes of all members in his caucus, not solely by threats and intimidation, but by inclusion.
Because the Republican margin was so slight, he should have paid special attention to any member whose vote was questionable. To do such might seem a compromise in some circles, but in politics it is very practical. Whether he respected the man or not, he needed Paul Horcher’s vote and might have secured it.
Thus rather than proceeding and dealing from a support base whose integrity was dubious, he could have ascertained beyond a doubt where Horcher stood and moved from that point. It is obvious from the optimism of Republican Members on Sunday night, December 4, and in Mr. Brulte’s comments to Assemblyman Cortese shortly before the Floor session on Monday morning that the Republican leader simply did not know what Horcher would do.
Philosophically, Republicans appealed to Democrats on ethical grounds, suggesting that a Republican speakership was “the will of the people” as evidenced in the voting record. If this were truly the case, then it would be wrong for Democrats to take any step to abrogate this “will” as expressed by the people.
“Willie,” some said, “had had a very long and illustrious reign as Speaker and was guaranteed a place in California history, yet he would do himself disgrace if he employed political gamesmanship to in some way retain the speakership.”
DRESS REHEARSAL
It seemed like such a small thing at the time. The night of December 4 in Frank Fat’s was a little busier than usual. Notably, Republican Leader Senator Ken Maddy of Fresno had booked the private room upstairs for an exclusive dinner and meeting. There were a few strange new faces in the house, beaming countenances of well-dressed professionals. There was a table set for twelve people in the main dining room.
Still, there were the familiar faces: Senator Ken Maddy, Senator Bob Beverly, Senator William Craven, Senator Tim Leslie, Senator Rebecca Morgan, Assemblyman/Senator Richard Mountjoy, and the complement of other Republican senators who would no doubt as a caucus discuss strategy in the upper chamber that night.
Downstairs, there were Members of the new legislature, confident, glowing with pride, surrounded by warm, equally proud family members, and rightly so. A few introduced themselves as newly elected Assembly Members from relative districts. Since they would be sworn in on Monday morning right before the floor session, their friends and relatives had come to Sacramento to witness the ceremony.
A very congenial Howard Kalloogian of Carlsbad and family took the large table in the dining room. As he and I stood by the bar discussing Mr. Brulte’s certain ascension to the speakership, I distinctly noticed there was not a single Democrat in the house. Albeit, Frank Fat’s in the 1990s was more popular with Republicans than with Democrats, but December 4 was the eve of the swearing in ceremony. Certainly Democrats had families!
Then Patty Jo Rutland, former aide to Willie, who in December handled Rules Committee personnel, told me that the Democrats were huddled up in caucus five blocks away at Ricci’s Restaurant on J Street. At that point, it became obvious that the speakership had not been conceded; it also became clear that the Democrats would converge on the Capitol in the morning ready to do battle.
GOVERNOR IN THE WINGS
Republican Assembly Members sans Paul Horcher did caucus, and they did so on Monday morning in Governor Wilson’s office. According to Capitol tradition, it is not the Governor’s place to meddle in the leadership affairs of the legislature. Neither is it politic, as the State’s chief executive needs cooperation from leadership on both sides in order to pass the State Budget proposal which requires a two-thirds vote from each house.
Governor Pete Wilson however, stood to benefit greatly with a Republican Speaker of the Assembly, especially since, unknown to many California voters who supported him, his eyes were on the 1996 U.S. Presidency. Counting numbers, he was aware that Paul Horcher’s vote was necessary to the Republicans. He was no doubt aware of Horcher’s claim that he would rather abstain than vote for Brulte. Considering this, the governor personally phoned Horcher after the November 8th election, stressing the importance of a party-line vote.
According to Republicans, Horcher assured the governor during that call that he would vote for Brulte. Beyond that, Wilson involved himself to the point of agreeing to make the dramatic call on the Assembly Floor, an appeal to Horcher, which would ultimately make the Whittier Republican hero-of-the-day as he cast the 41st vote for Brulte.
Though surreptitiously, he had worked to assist James Brulte all along. On Monday morning, he privately administered the oath of office to Mountjoy in order to abort Democrat attempts at disqualifying him from the Assembly. Then when the session convened, the Governor’s office attempted to contact Horcher on the floor, though unsuccessfully. Paul Horcher refused the call.
THE FLOOR SHOW
The stage was set. The players had taken their places. Willie, as always, was dressed impeccably, sporting a dark blue European-tailored suit, a white-collared, blue-striped shirt and a blue necktie with white polka dots. Yet if Willie was the best-dressed man on the floor, then James Brulte stood out for his auspicious position, if not for sheer size, wearing what seemed like a charcoal-gray privately tailored suit, a crisp white shirt, and a red-and-gray paisley necktie. Paul Horcher’s suit was dark blue, accented by a red tie with intricate white designs.
The Assembly chamber was impressive as usual, but on that Monday morning there was certain electricity in the air, a sense that something of great significance was ready to happen. All assembly seats were full at center stage, the press waited eagerly in their area up center, and the gallery was full of family, friends, lobbyists, and political pundits who whispered nervously as finely-dressed Dotson Wilson, Assembly Chief Clerk, called the prodigious session to order from the dais down center.
As names were called, Byron Sher objected to Richard Mountjoy answering the roll call, suggesting he was “unduly elected.” In answer, Ross Johnson announced that Mr. Mountjoy had been personally sworn in by the Governor of California just moments earlier. I had taken my seat in the gallery and had cued up my recording device in order to chronicle every turn of events on what was anticipated to have been Willie Brown’s last day as Assembly Speaker.
SCENE I: THE MOUNTJOY QUESTION
No sooner had the session been called to order did Harvard Law School graduate and law professor Byron Sher stand to raise the question on whether Richard Mountjoy of Arcadia was a “duly-elected and qualified” member, eligible to vote on the speakership issue. When the question was put to Mr. Wilson, he quickly ruled that the point of order was “not well-taken,” that the Members voting determine their own rules, that the House could vote to dispense with the procedure set forth in Government Code Section 9023.
But the Republicans in the Assembly outnumbered Democrats 41 to 39, and thus a vote would be useless unless numbers could be adjusted. If Paul Horcher was inclined to vote in favor of making Richard Mountjoy ineligible to vote for a Speaker, then the numbers or vote on such a specific motion would change to 40-40, but still, this was not the majority required to pass such a motion. Thus the next question posed by Professor Sher was, “Should Richard Mountjoy be allowed to vote on the motion to determine whether to dispense with Government Code Section 9023?”
On this matter, the Chief Clerk ruled that such a motion was a “procedural motion” and thus Mr. Mountjoy would be allowed to vote on such a question. Once again, the Democrats looked at the numbers, and here the proceedings became a little convoluted. According to the Assembly Rules, section 107, “In case of equal division, or tie vote, the question shall be lost.” They argued then, “Should Richard Mountjoy, a member whose eligibility was in question, be allowed to vote on this ‘procedural motion’ which would get the Assembly to the question on whether or not he was a ‘duly qualified’ member?”
This was, by far, the most important question of the day, as the Clerk’s ruling would make or break Democrat hopes of keeping Willie as Speaker. Chief Clerk Dotson Wilson, much to the disappointment of Democrats, stuck to his initial ruling that Richard Mountjoy would be able to vote on the “procedural motion,” citing “precedent” as the reason for such decision. Since the ruling was that Richard Mountjoy would be allowed to vote on the motion, then the Republicans, even without Paul Horcher, had 40 votes, and the “procedural motion,” needing 41, would never pass.
Thus the Assembly could never get to the question on whether or not Richard Mountjoy was a “duly-elected and qualified” Member, and the numbers could not be readjusted. It would remain Republicans – 41, Democrats – 39. Elated with the ruling, Republicans at once called the Chief Clerk to commence with “The Orders of the Day,” as required by Government Code Section 9023; they were ready to elect James Brulte as Speaker.
But the Democrats were not going to concede without a fight. Richard Katz of Panorama City pushed the issue, suggesting the clerk’s rulings were “inconsistent,” and though Mr. Wilson remained unmoved, he did concede that “the Assembly could specify a different procedure, if so desired.” “And would he be eligible to vote on that?” Katz asked. Wilson answered that Mountjoy could vote on any procedural question but that he could not vote on any substantive question relating to his own eligibility. After an exchange in which Dotson Wilson seemed to be frustrated with Mr. Katz’s questions, the clerk called for nominations for Speaker.
When pressed further by Assembly Member Jackie Speier of San Francisco, Mr. Wilson reiterated that such a “different procedure” would be a move to “dispense with Government Code Section 9023” by a majority of Members present and voting, and thus the House itself would make that determination. Rising again, Republican parliamentarian Ross Johnson urged the Assembly Clerk to proceed with the “Orders of the Day,” and thus Mr. Wilson opened nominations for Speaker of the Assembly for the 1995-1996 session.
SCENE II: NOMINATIONS
It was a foregone conclusion. The Democrats would name Willie Brown as their choice and the Republicans would call for James Brulte. The speeches were largely rhetorical, as neither Democrats nor Republicans were apt to change.
JOHN VASCONCELLOS TO NOMINATE WILLIE BROWN FOR SPEAKER
The first to rise was Democrat John Vasconcellos, who nominated Willie Lewis Brown, Jr. for Speaker just as he had on December 3, 1980, when the San Francisco assemblyman first won the Speakership. He proclaimed Willie Brown as “best qualified to lead the house,” calling him a “Members’ Speaker” and citing as accomplishments his inclusion of women and persons of color in Assembly operations and leadership, his leadership on Business, Economic, and Public Safety issues, and his efforts which have kept the doors to education “somewhat open.” He concluded by suggesting that in such a divided State, Willie’s leadership and talent were needed.
JOE BACA TO SECOND NOMINATION OF WILLIE BROWN
In a succinct manner, Joe Baca seconded the nomination, highlighting that Willie Brown’s leadership was one of inclusion. In doing so, Baca quashed any suggestion that he was a potential defector.
MARGUERITE ARCHIE-HUDSON TO SECOND NOMINATION OF WILLIE BROWN
Ms. Archie-Hudson stood to call Willie Brown “quite clearly the most experienced, the most competent, the fairest person,” with the ability to heal, lead, and manage the House in the way it needs to be managed. She emphasized that he had convened the State’s first Economic Summit and first Education Summit, and she concluded, directing attention to his record of inclusion for all members.
JACKIE SPEIER TO SECOND NOMINATION OF WILLIE BROWN
Calling to attention the many children present, Ms. Speier reminded the Assembly and onlookers of Mr. Brown’s dedication to education. She added that Workers’ Compensation Reform came about because of Willie Brown. Finally, she called members to remember that in the last budget vote, Willie had brought many Democrats to the table and got them to vote for a budget they did not necessarily support.
ROSS JOHNSON TO NOMINATE JAMES BRULTE FOR SPEAKER
Welcoming the twenty-eight new Members, Mr. Johnson called December 5 a “dramatic new day.” Admitting that the State faced great challenges, he nominated James Brulte, an “intelligent, pragmatic, thoughtful leader who understands every challenge is also an opportunity.” In the most rhetorical speech of the day, Mr. Johnson told the assemblage that Mr. Brulte understood the problems of the state and would make California “a place we are proud to call our home.”
Of Willie Brown he said, “Clearly, his record length of service will never be equaled, his domination of the process of the affairs of this house will probably never be equaled – and frankly it probably shouldn’t be equaled.” Concluding, he elucidated, “Mr. Speaker and Members— Time marches on. For even the great Joe Montana, the day will come when he must hang up his cleats and move on. For Willie Lewis Brown, Jr., that day has come.” Thus for a second time Ross Johnson nominated James Brulte for Speaker.
FRED AGUIAR TO SECOND NOMINATION OF JAMES BRULTE
Seconding the nomination of James Brulte, Mr. Aguiar reminded the Assembly and public how Mr. Brulte had been an effective leader, taking 33 Republican caucus Members and increasing their ranks to the present majority. Suggesting that because James Brulte could build consensus, coalition, and bi-partisan support, Mr. Aguiar reasoned the Republican from Rancho Cucamonga would be an effective Speaker. For those reasons he seconded the nomination.
RICHARD MOUNTJOY TO SECOND THE NOMINATION OF JAMES BRULTE
Not initially intending to speak, Mr. Mountjoy said it was important that he did so, calling to mind the narrow balance in the Assembly. Notwithstanding, he asserted that the “voters in this State have voted to change leadership, to change direction of the House.”
In an address that seemed like a passionate plea to any wavering Democrats, he pointed out, “My seconding does not in any way say that Willie Lewis Brown, Jr. has not done a great and magnificent job at directing affairs of the House over the years. He has made progress.” In seconding he did, however, say that the election of James Brulte as Speaker would be “the beginning of a non-partisan movement to put California back as the Golden State.”
“We will not lose the talents of Willie Brown and John Vasconcellos,” he concluded, because they would still be around, working in behalf of the Assembly.
With no one else to speak, the nominations were closed.
SCENE III: THE MOUNTJOY QUESTION REVISITED
The next order of business was the Speakership vote. As John Burton stood to be recognized for a Parliamentary Inquiry, the proceedings were interrupted by a delegation from the Senate, Senators O’Connell, Polanco, and Kopp, who had come to inform the Assembly that the Senate was “duly organized for the 1995-96 session and is ready to proceed with the business of the State.” John Burton’s microphone had been turned off during the Senate interruption for speaking out of turn.
Next, Byron Sher rose and offered, “Since Government Section Code 9171 provides that the Speaker shall be elected by the majority vote of the ‘duly and qualified elected Members of the Assembly,’ I move that Mr. Mountjoy not be allowed to participate in that vote in that he is not a duly elected and qualified member of the Assembly.”
Finally, Mr. Sher had introduced the motion that the Democrats had worked so hard to put to the Assembly Parliamentarian. Cleverly, he had made it directly relevant to the Speakership vote, which was imminent.
Thus once again, the Democrats wanted to leave the call to the judgment of the Assembly Clerk, but Clerk Wilson deferred to the House; he was loath to make the call. Instead he ruled that, based on his earlier ruling, Mr. Sher’s motion was out of order, determining that the only way to such a motion was for the House to dispense with Government Section Code 9023 which called the election of Speaker the first order of business for the Assembly.
His microphone restored, John Burton rose again to state his Parliamentary Inquiry, asking if there was any way to get the issue relating to eligibility of voting Members, and patiently the Chief Clerk reasserted that the only way to get to the question was to dispense with Government Section Code 9023.
The clerk’s ruling, to Democrats, Republicans, onlookers, and the general public, seemed to be a death sentence for Willie Brown’s speakership because the Democrats had known from the start that they simply did not have the numbers to dispense with the Government Section Code.
Yet Willie, who had remained outside the debate, sat coolly at his desk, chin resting on his fingers. As the clerk began to call roll for the election of Speaker, only Willie – who in 1974 had learned the absolute importance of numbers – only Willie knew the count.
SCENE IV: ROLL CALL FOR THE ELECTION OF SPEAKER
This climactic scene was full of excitement, suspense and surprise as the Assembly Floor Show of December 5, 1994, exceeded all expectations of its billing. Stating rules for the voting procedure, Dotson Wilson said there would be no passes granted unless the respective legislative leaders approved of them. As the clerk called each Member’s name, the Member was to respond by stating the name of the candidate of choice. Immediately, the clerk began to call the roll and the vote began.
“Aguiar?” “Aguiar— Brulte” “Allen?” “Allen— Brulte” “Alpert?” “Alpert— Brown.”
The air in the chamber was statically charged and tense as all present sensed the weight of the moment. Republicans eagerly awaited the end of Willie Brown’s speakership perhaps even more so than they did Jim Brulte’s golden opportunity while Democrats and a plethora of staffers hoped that Willie had, for their sakes, kept one more ace up his sleeve.
Still, with each vote cast for Brulte, the end of Willie’s speakership and an entire era seemed near at hand.
“Brulte?” Brulte— Brulte” “Caldera?” “Caldera— Brown.”
Paul Horcher sat in front of Willard Murray, who was seated with his daughter. “Cortese?” Nothing. Dominic Cortese, still anticipating what Diamond Bar Republican Horcher would do, had passed. If Horcher voted for Brulte when called, then Cortese could add to Brulte’s margin of victory by making his vote the 42nd. More than this, his vote would be a symbol of bi-partisan support for the Republican.
“Granlund?” “Granlund— Brulte” “Hauser?” “Hauser— Brown.”
And so it went.
Hypothetically, if Richard Mountjoy had been ousted from the Assembly by Democrats and had been declared ineligible to vote, Paul Horcher would have been left with two options:
1) He could have voted for Brown, and Willie would have won as Speaker 40-39. But voting for Willie would spell major consequences with Republicans and his constituency. The Republicans had already drawn papers and had threatened a recall if Horcher supported Brown;
and 2) Paul Horcher could have abstained from voting, leaving the Republicans and Democrats in a deadlock at 39-39. In this scenario Horcher would have been left with ground for bargaining and a forum for public sympathy. As the deciding vote in such an important contest, he could have made a serious pitch for a judgeship from the Governor. In abstention, Horcher could have finally brought his case against Republican caucus leadership to the public.
Paul Horcher had married a Vietnamese woman and had allegedly never been accepted by conservative Republicans as a result. Horcher declined to discuss specifics, but a close personal friend of his told me in an interview that Paul was hurt by a specific racial epithet used to describe his wife by some conservative Republicans during his first election. During public campaigns, the Republican Party did not support him, while in private it was whispered by colleagues that he would be overly sympathetic to foreigners who had invaded southern California.
Several Republicans I spoke with countered Horcher’s charges by saying that his ostracism had little to do with his wife, but rather more with the assertion that he was a heavy drinker and “generally sleazy.”
However, much to the consternation of the Democrats, Richard Mountjoy had not been ousted from the Assembly, leaving Mr. Horcher with a different set of options:
1) He could have gone along with the Governor’s plan, voted for Brulte, been hero for the day, and remained an outsider in the Republican caucus;
or 2) He could have bolted, declaring himself an independent, voted for Brown, been hero for the day, and pursued an independent agenda in Sacramento regardless of a certain recall. He would tell me months later that term limits had a major impact on his decision, that as an Assembly “lame duck” [a Member precluded by the State from running again] he had little to lose by making such a bold move.
“Hawkins?” “Hawkins— Brulte.”
By this time, Republicans and Democrats alike knew that, while eighty members would vote, one man would decide the speakership. All eyes were on Paul Horcher as the call continued.
“Hoge?” “Hoge— Brulte.”
There had been talk that Horcher might abstain, and perhaps James Brulte was ready to accept an abstention that would have been irrelevant. He may have even guessed by this time that his disaffected colleague might go the other way, but Willie Brown was a professional at the game– he knew the count.
“Horcher?”
Slamming his fist onto his desk, Paul Horcher shouted a name the Republicans couldn’t believe they were hearing, a name that sent Democrats into unrestrained frenzy. He shouted,
“Brown!”
Thus Mr. Horcher had changed the fate of the California Assembly Speakership. Contrary to predictions of Republican leadership, the press, and even the challenger himself, James Brulte would not become Speaker on December 5, 1994.
Paul Horcher left the floor immediately after voting, escorted by the Assembly Sergeant at Arms into the Speaker’s chamber. The call continued in anticlimactic fashion right down to Assembly Member Woods, who voted for Brulte.
Dominic Cortese had passed, and so he had yet to vote, but he was not about to be the sole Democrat who sided with the Republicans and gave them the speakership. Unlike Paul Horcher, who had little to lose, Mr. Cortese hoped to be a Democrat Senator one day. His vote for Willie Brown tied the speakership vote at 40 for Speaker Willie Brown, 40 for challenger James Brulte.
SCENE V: FLOORSHOW EPILOGUE
Subject to interpretation by the chief clerk, it seemed the Democrats believed that the conclusion of the Speakership vote albeit deadlocked constituted fulfillment of Government Code Section 9023. Republican parliamentarian Ross Johnson, however, noting Paul Horcher’s conspicuous absence, saw an opportunity and moved a Call of the Assembly, which would have conceivably forced Mr. Horcher back into the chamber to face those Members he had betrayed.
Chief clerk Wilson however, ruled the motion out of order as the vote had already been announced. Democrat Richard Katz quickly rose for a parliamentary inquiry to determine whether the Republican was requesting unanimous consent for a Call of the Assembly, objecting to the motion. The clerk called for a second, but none came right away.
Bristling, trembling with anger, Mr. Johnson withdrew the motion, saying, “If Mr. Katz would prefer this spectacle for the people of California, that’s his choice, and let’s just let it go.” The clerk then indicated that the only two motions in order were the “motion for a call” and the” motion to adjourn.”
Consequently, Democrat John Burton motioned to adjourn. Determined to pursue a Call of the Assembly, Mr. Johnson rose and asked what vote was required to adopt a motion to adjourn to which Mr. Wilson replied, “a majority of Members present and voting.” Addressing Republican colleagues in the chamber in language disguised as a parliamentary inquiry, Ross Johnson concluded with the following, “So those of us who would like to stay here and resolve this matter which we are statutorily required to do should vote no and oppose this motion to adjourn… and since we can conduct no other business until we’ve elected a Speaker, I assume folks can send out for their pillows and their pajamas and we can stay awhile.”
John Burton, in contrast, reasoned that in reality there was no business for the Assembly to perform between December 5 and January and suggested recessing to a fixed time, thus allowing Members to spare their families a tiresome, lengthy debate that had no certain conclusion.
As the discussion went back and forth, Willie Brown finally stood and offered, “I request unanimous consent that we precede to the introduction of bills by individual members so that in fact business can commence.” In the absence of any objection, the clerk stated that bill introductions would be permitted.
A master of Assembly Rules, Willie’s request for unanimous consent was offered to disguise his true intent, which was to get the Assembly to commence business, unwittingly thus dispensing with the Orders of the Day, which the Assembly did.
Eventually realizing what had happened forty-two Bills, three Constitutional Amendments and two Assembly Joint Resolutions later, Ross Johnson rose for a Point of Order, saying that the House had chosen to deviate from the Orders of the Day in allowing unanimous consent to the introduction of bills, but that the Orders of the Day were still in effect.
Willie Brown differed, pointing out that he was granted unanimous consent to commence with introduction of bills and commence with business. The intent of his request, he said, was not limited to the introduction of bills. Thus if the House had consented to the introduction of bills and other business, such constituted dispensing with the Orders of the Day and therefore other business could be heard without a motion to dispense with Government Code Section 9023. Succinctly, the granting of unanimous consent by the membership in the matter automatically dispensed with the Government Code Section.
Law Professor Sher was first to ask the question, “Since unanimous consent for the introduction of bills and other business was not limited, is not a motion to determine the qualification of a Member in order at this time?” Again in a difficult place, Assembly Clerk Wilson refrained from ruling on the matter, deferring it to a vote by a majority of Members present and voting.
Finally, the question was put to the house: “Does the Body wish to proceed with other business?” Clearly, it was an issue the Democrats could not and did not win as they lost 39-40 right down party lines with Horcher still absent.
The floor debate that day was spirited and angry, at least on the Republican side. Republican Member Trice Harvey of Bakersfield would say, “We had one political whore today and it happened to be a Republican, and he was bought fair and square by the Speaker [referring to Willie Brown],” causing Willie to put a formal motion to have the inappropriate remarks stricken from the record. Asked by Sacramento Democrat Phil Isenberg to apologize, Harvey responded, “I’d say I’m sorry he’s a whore.”
In the end, however, the Democrats didn’t have enough votes to oust Mountjoy and neither Republicans nor Democrats had the votes to elect a Speaker. The only two motions that could be considered were motions to adjourn and to place a Call of the House. Over the next six hours, Members argued over how to adjourn and over what would be the Orders of the Day when the House reconvened. In a final ruling, Clerk Wilson stated that, pursuant to Government Code Section 9023, the first Order of Business would be the election of Speaker when the Assembly reconvened.
Shortly after 6:00 p.m., the Assembly heard a motion by James Brulte to adjourn until 10:30 A.M., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. The motion carried with 42 aye votes and 23 noes. The united Republicans along with Democratic Members Dominic Cortese and Martin Gallegos of Baldwin Park supplied the votes that carried the Motion for Adjournment. The session was adjourned at 6:31 p.m.
THE EALRY REVIEWS
Reactions were immediate and passionate. The early reviews were coming in even before the cast had left center stage. Angry with the chief clerk, John Burton went to the platform and began a caustic diatribe accented by threatening body posture, complete with finger pointing and voice amplification. Waiting impatiently to have her say, former Assembly Member turned U.S. Congresswoman Maxine Waters, in no uncertain terms, voiced her displeasure at Mr. Wilson’s rulings. What will follow are the reviews, as I was able to gather them, according to individual subjects:
ON DOTSON WILSON
Willie Brown: It was a dream for me to give the torch of the clerkship to another African American. Mr. Wilson was a gentleman who started with me as an intern. I recommended Mr. Wilson for the job of chief clerk. I lobbied my membership, got the votes for Mr. Wilson, got Mr. Wilson installed as chief clerk, over the objections of the Republicans… who yesterday received the benefits of his decisions.
[on Dotson Wilson’s decision not to consider the Mountjoy question after granting unanimous consent to Willie Brown for the introduction of bills and other business:] That was the worst of all rulings. That was clearly a bum call. I’m telling you, there was something that was basically off key with Mr. Wilson yesterday… [They were] horrible rulings that ruined my day… [They] frankly made no sense at all.
[on being asked if he still supported Dotson Wilson as chief clerk]: Absolutely!
Byron Sher: It was clear from watching him yesterday that he was under a great deal of pressure. It was a very tough position to be in. Nobody elected him to anything, yet there he was, making the decisions.
The Republicans [through spokesperson Phil Perry]: He made fair rulings, but he didn’t follow the script that Willie and the Democrats wrote for him.
Individual Republicans were laconic in speaking about the chief clerk, the majority of their comments addressing the defection of Horcher and Willie Brown’s floor strategy. Among other Capitol observers however, reviews ranged from strong support for Dotson Wilson who had chosen “integrity over loyalty” to the most vehement critics who called him “Judas Iscariot” and “Uncle Tom.”
The sheer stress of the floor session and harsh animadversion from critics in the ensuing hours aggravated pre-existing health problems for Mr. Wilson and caused him to seek necessary medical help. After a visit to the emergency room at Methodist Hospital in Sacramento, his doctor ordered him to take two days off from work for stress-related exhaustion and dehydration.
ON WILLIE BROWN:
Willie Brown: I didn’t start 30 years ago to suddenly decide in the 31st year of my career that with all this time, talent and energy, I am somehow going to disqualify myself from the top job.
Phil Isenberg: He’s the smartest person you are ever going to meet in this business.
Republican parliamentarian Ross Johnson: [To Willie] you’re not going to steal an election in private. You’re going to steal it in public out here in front of God and the television cameras and everybody else.
Former L.A. County Supervisor Pete Schabarum [co-author of the 1990 term-limits initiative, Proposition 140]: I want to do whatever it takes to keep Willie out of the Speaker’s office.
ON PAUL HORCHER:
Paul Horcher [in a press release]: My decision to become an independent is… an attempt to move us all in the direction of a bipartisan legislature, out of the quagmire created by the party system… As an independent, I’ll be free of political party bosses and better able to fight for my constituents, and one of my first decisions as an independent is to continue experienced leadership in the Assembly.
James Brulte: He’s a Willie Brown independent. His district is contiguous to mine and I don’t think Willie Brown independents are going to be real popular down there.
James Brulte [offered separately]: Some people get out of touch over the years. Some people get out of touch between the time they’re elected in November and the time they are sworn in.
Former L.A. County Supervisor Pete Schabarum: He’s… a bad man who has been taking care of No. 1 – himself.
Republican Assembly Member Trice Harvey: We had one political whore today and it happened to be a Republican.
Willie Brown: I didn’t offer Mr. Horcher anything. I didn’t win Mr. Horcher. They lost Mr. Horcher.
California Governor Pete Wilson [through a spokesperson]: We were a little less than pleased, I can say, with Mr. Horcher. We have the utmost respect for Speaker Brown… But clearly the governor’s preference is to have a Republican Legislature there.
ON RICHARD MOUNTJOY:
Willie Brown: Mr. Mountjoy has made it clear that he intends to be a state Senator. He only wishes to participate in the Forest Lawn ceremony for Willie Brown. Once he has done the Forest Lawn ceremony… he will dust his hands of that dirt and move over to the Senate.
ON THE SPEAKERSHIP STALEMATE:
Willie Brown: It will be resolved. When the parties on both sides of the aisle understand that a house with such a small difference cannot operate without some basic understanding about every aspect of the control and delivery system.
Willie Brown [offered separately]: If you are intelligent enough to realize 40 isn’t 41, you sit down and you put together a house operation reflective of that distribution. That will be done eventually when reality sets in.
Willie Brown: This is absolutely stupid. This is juvenile. Nobody is going to change their mind. You’re not going to force anybody to change their vote. We need to keep the dignity of the place.
James Brulte: I believe that whether it takes a day or a week or a month, we’ll just keep coming back until we elect a speaker. Nothing is in concrete. Today is today and tomorrow is tomorrow.
Governor Pete Wilson: There is a lot to do, and I think the people are impatient. They are far more interested in seeing the job done, and I don’t think they’ve got a whole lot of time or patience for these kind of squabbles.
Dominic Cortese: It’s an opportunity for the moderates to have their say.
Garden Grove Republican Curt Pringle: There’s no question things are going to have to change. I don’t believe any Speaker will have the powers Willie held. We are certainly going to have to ensure that there are Republicans and Democrats are working together.
Chico Republican Bernie Richter: I am willing to sit here until hell freezes over, until we elect a speaker.
Marina Del Rey Democrat Debra Bowen: A 41st vote is not going to solve the problems and make this house run right. We ought to be aiming for a solution where there is some kind of agreement made about how power is exercised.
ON JIM BRULTE:
[on his failure to translate 41 Republican votes into a Republican speakership]
Republican Assembly source who asked not to be identified: When you’re betting against Willie Brown, you can’t afford to guess about the wild cards. Brulte should have known where Horcher stood.
“Veteran of GOP politics” as quoted in the Sacramento Bee: Brulte “screwed up big time!”[lxiv]
Democrat Sal Cannella of Ceres: I think it has to do with egos. [The election] gave Mr. Brulte a distorted picture on how the Republicans were going to take over the House. That feeling of triumph… overshadowed his need to reach out.[lxv]
In the hours following the adjournment of the Assembly session the media frenzy was in full gear. Many members spoke openly to the press, putting on various characteristic spins, subject to motive. Lobbyists and other capitol insiders were naturally more reticent, keeping their rumors, opinions, privileged information, revelations, and predictions among themselves. Probably the most circulated rumor in the early hours suggested that Willie had indeed offered Paul Horcher something in exchange for his vote.
According to some speculation, Willie had, through U.S.
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D- San Francisco, CA) secured a federal judiciary
appointment for Horcher by President Bill Clinton, not subject to Senate
confirmation. The sequel has rendered the suggestion false and lacking in
foundation. Nevertheless, this rumor and other gossip in the ensuing weeks was
indicative of a certain sense of excitement and intrigue prevalent at the time.
If Monday, December 5 had not been full of one surprising turn after another,
then Tuesday, December 6, would have been a much more memorable day.
ACT II
THE TABLES TURN
No doubt Willie knew it not long after the session, and certainly before anyone else in the Capitol knew it. Dotson Wilson would not be on the platform with gavel to open the December 6 session. While Willie denied asking the chief clerk to stay home, he would suggest publicly that his former aide was “disoriented,” but it was a doctor who ordered the clerk to take two days off work. According to Assembly rules, at the beginning of the session, the chief clerk should preside over the vote for speaker.
However, in the absence of the chief clerk, the Member with the greatest seniority should preside. Having served in the California Assembly since December 1964, Willie Brown was without a doubt the longest-tenured Member and, according to House protocol, had a right to preside after being faxed, along with James Brulte and the Governor, by Dotson Wilson with the news that the clerk would not return for the 10:30 session on December 6.
Proclaiming himself “presiding officer,” it was Willie Brown who opened the December 6 session on Tuesday morning, but all the Republicans were absent. If even one Republican had attended, Willie could have declared “a quorum” [41 Members present] and could have officially begun Assembly business. Without a doubt, the first order of business would have been to reverse the rulings of Dotson Wilson.
Proceeding immediately to the question of Richard Mountjoy’s eligibility, Willie would have excluded Mr. Mountjoy from the procedural vote on whether to consider the question. He commented, “I think the procedural votes, if I am presiding, will not be a problem.”
Then the Democrats plus Independent Horcher would vote to oust Mountjoy from the Assembly, and finally the Assembly would return to the speakership vote and would re-elect San Francisco’s Willie Brown. Fearing such a scenario, Republicans eschewed the Assembly chamber, fleeing to caucus instead at the Hyatt Hotel across from the Capitol on L Street.
“They know I’ve got ‘em!” Willie triumphed. “They’re scrambling.” Hoping to catch one or two lingering Republicans off-guard, Willie ordered the sergeants at arms to round up any Republican still in the Capitol, but not a one remained. After ninety minutes of the non-session, he declared recess for the day.
Later Willie would reflect, “It was a terrible mistake for the Republicans to walk out on us. I should have sent the California Highway Patrol to bring those boys back to the Capitol or walk over there myself with the TV cameras following me… constitute a quorum at the Hyatt and organize the house.”[lxvi] After a week of sessions in the chamber without the Republicans, Willie decided to recess until January 4, hoping to hold talks on shared power with Jim Brulte and Republican leaders in the meantime.
SACRAMENTO SUB ROSA
Even before the December 5 session, both Republicans and Democrats had targeted specific Members on opposite sides who could perhaps be swayed or pressured to change their Speakership votes.
REPUBLICANS:
It was no secret that Dominic Cortese would support Jim Brulte if he had the 41st vote, but that 41st would be hard to find in a unified Democrat caucus controlled by Willie Brown. Paul Horcher had played his trump card and was not inclined to change, so the Republicans looked to a Democrat who had won a tough race and hoped to pressure him to change in order to survive a special election.
They focused on freshman Michael Machado of Linden. After a direct approach for support failed, they used a recall threat in hopes of getting him to change his vote. Reminding him of the narrowness of his win in November and his pledge to be independent of Democratic leadership, Republicans threatened to recall him if he did not change his allegiance and vote for James Brulte on the speakership issue. They believed he was the key vote, as with Machado would come Cortese and perhaps one or two other moderate Democrats.
In mid-December, the Republican leader would say, “I believe when all is said and done there are going to be 41 votes for Jim Brulte as speaker.” However, the threats only served to disincline Machado and other wavering Members and consolidate the Democrat caucus, causing Phil Isenberg of Sacramento to reflect, “They made the mistake of assaulting politically all the Democrats they wish to work with.”
Even as Republicans worked behind the scenes to motivate Democrat Members to defect, their leader was publicly optimistic while critical of Willie Brown. He predicted, “It is only a question of when there will be a Republican speaker, not if there will be one. We will not allow the verdict of California voters to be overturned by Willie Brown engaging in the political equivalent of jury tampering.”
The public response by Democrats came from Richard Katz, who countered, “Democrats are unified… I would remind you when Mr. Brulte starts talking about ‘unified’ or ‘numbers’ or ‘commitments’ that he told you he had 41 votes for speaker on December 5.”
DEMOCRATS:
Willie Brown allies focused their energies on two Republicans who stood independent of Mr. Brulte and his inner circle. Even before the floor session on December 5th, Republican Doris Allen of Cypress was engaged in dialogue with Democrat leadership relating to a non-vote for James Brulte. The sequel suggests that in late November/early December Democrats were already considering the possibility of unanimously supporting a moderate Republican for speaker.
But Doris Allen was not about to vote for Willie Brown or to abstain from voting, not when she hoped to win the next open senatorial seat in her district. In a special election, she would eventually run against fellow Republican caucus Member Ross Johnson of Placentia who unabashedly pressed the conservative agenda of the leadership. Nevertheless, the rift between moderate Allen and the conservative leadership was evident, but the Democrats could not exploit it in December.
The second prospect for the Democrats was Chico Republican Bernie Richter who would later openly seek the job as speaker. However, there were problems with getting united Democrat support for him because Richter was a conservative and a major proponent of the California Civil Rights Initiative of 1996, a measure seeking to eliminate affirmative action in the State. Two Democrats indicated they simply would not support the Republican based on his civil rights position.
NEGOTIATIONS:
Negotiations did not become viable until the December 5 deadlock, not for Republicans who were certain they would elect James Brulte as speaker. Yet even after the tie vote, Republicans were loath to discuss details of a compromise with Democrats. With a Paul Horcher recall in full swing, Brulte suggested he was willing to shut the Assembly down until the recall vote in April. Further, he was confident he would get Mike Machado or one or two other Democrats to defect. Willie Brown on the other hand proposed a “shared speakership” commenting,
I told them, on Nov. 10, at the press availability, I said no one has 41 votes. I said that up front. And I do not believe anyone’s going to get to 41 votes. Because I don’t think they know how. And when they ultimately believe that, they will then sit down and say, “Willie Brown, how do we put this operation together? How do we build a consensus of 50 or 60 people?” And I have consistently said I am open and willing to do that. Even if it means I’m not speaker. That’s how clear I am. And when you play with a hand like that, you can usually be successful because everybody else is trying to protect something.[lxvii]
In an interview circa December 6/7 with political editor Philip J. Trounstine of the San Jose Mercury News, Willie revealed that he had planned on re-winning the speakership on December 5 and why:
For only one reason– I want to leave that institution intact. And I think, among all the membership I probably posses the best skills to do that in what I view as a transition period. I don’t anticipate holding on or being the speaker through even 1995. Had I been properly elected speaker Monday, I would have made that exact statement.
James Brulte however, who on December 5th had longed for the imperial mantle only to walk away naked, was certain he would enjoy an eventual coronation. Thus as Willie suggested methods for shared power in a lasting arrangement, Brulte negotiated for the short term, as Republicans pursued a Horcher recall and a certain majority in April 1995.
Fundamentally for the Democrats, there could be no deal with Republicans unless the agreement would last unaltered for two years. Republicans, for their part were unwilling to commit for such a period of time.
In their ideal scenario, once they regained a majority [41 votes] they could scrap any agreement with the Democrats and proceed with their own agenda. During that time, the term “scorched earth policy” was popular among conservative Republicans, an expression used to describe how within a GOP-dominated legislature, that all Democrat Assembly staffers would be fired, and Democrat Members would be stripped of valuable personal staff.
Thus the idea of this “scorched earth policy” only served to divide the camps and consolidate the Democrats and staff, creating an environment of distrust. Confident of the Horcher recall, Republicans preferred to wait for a majority in April rather than deal with Willie, whom they feared.
During December, Willie used the media to put his opinions and desired ends on record. While Republicans suspected him of double-dealing and the public believed he was playing a game over which he was the complete master, the sequel has shown him more a statesman than duplicitous politician. Denying that he wanted to remain speaker indefinitely, he said,
I think that what I need to do, what John Vasconcellos needs to do, what John Burton needs to do, is take one, two or three of the Members who have three to four years left, and literally, over the next few months, share with them everything we know about the institution, about building consensus for public policy purposes and then turn it over to them.
The sequel: On January 24, Willie tried unsuccessfully to get Republican Bernie Richter elected as speaker. A few months later, he would pass the speakership to a Republican, offering full support.
On the transition of power in the Assembly and the suggested role of experienced Members, he said,
In the last few months of our existence in that place, prior to the spring of ‘95, we ought to be their Speaker Emeritus, Chairman Emeritus—we ought to be that resource that they can call upon and then when it’s clear they can fly on their own, get the hell out of the way.
The sequel: During the spring of 1995, Willie became Speaker Emeritus after successfully electing a Republican speaker with united Democrat support; initially acting as an advisor for the only other person to hold the job in fourteen years, Willie made it clear that he would be leaving the Assembly prior to the fall of 1995.
On the legacy of term limits and true public service, he said,
You know, there’s politics that get you there, and there are politics of service. Most cannot, in short periods of time, make the transition to service… There’s the politics of the election and politics of service in the house. And they’re two separate animals. One person can master, almost by accident, the ability to get elected. But you can’t by accident, put together the timber program for the state of California. You can’t, by accident, put together the underground tank removal program… You can’t by accident, put together worker’s comp reform. You can get elected every day of your life by accident. Incompetent people get elected. Incompetent people do not make public policy.
THIRD FLOOR OFFICE:
Within the Capitol, the Office of the Speaker of the Assembly is 219 on the second floor. Directly above that office is a large cozy space numbered 319. For years, Speaker Brown had held that space for various uses including a press office. Not long before the December 5th floor session, Willie decided to make the office headquarters for the Assembly Minority Leader and gave James Brulte a substantial sum of money to renovate and decorate it. It was not the office that Brulte wanted, but it was not a bad consolation prize.
WILLIE’S PROPOSAL:
Titled, “Principles for Bipartisan Cooperation,” Willie suggested transferring some of the Speaker’s powers to the Rules Committee, comprised of an even number of Republicans and Democrats and co-chaired by the two leaders, namely James Brulte and himself. He and Brulte would also be co-presiding officers of the House, sharing the primary powers of the speakership. Other speaker’s powers would be transferred to the party caucuses who would elect all committee members according to the rule that the chairman and vice-chairman would have to come from different parties. Committee membership would be proportional as determined by party caucuses. In the meantime, Willie sent a letter to each of the eighteen freshmen Republican Members calling for a meeting to discuss “House organization issues,” but the group uniformly rejected his offer.
Privately however, a few of the freshmen were ready to consider a different Republican leadership.
BRULTE’S PLAN:
James Brulte, if he could not be speaker, also wanted to reform the powers of the office, but only much more drastically. He proposed a constitutional amendment that would shift all the key powers of the speakership to the Rules Committee. Within that Rules Committee, the composition would be proportionate to the partisan split of lawmakers. Any party with 41 members or more would control that powerful committee.
Brulte’s proposal if passed however, which would require approval of both houses of the Legislature and voter approval, would not take effect for two years. The proposal did nothing to address the deadlock in the Assembly in December. In response to the proposal, Willie wrote,
I remain disappointed that you do not wish to seek an immediate solution to the current stalemate. As you know, the constitutional amendment you suggest could not take effect for two years… (and will) only affect our mutual successors.
Convinced that James Brulte would not agree to shared power, Democrats began to sound Republicans to determine if any might be inclined to support another Republican rather than Brulte. In early January 1995, I heard a story from a close and completely reliable inside source that Willie met with at least two Republicans on December 28th and that a freshman Republican expressed a desire to be speaker, a young relatively unknown freshman from Fresno by the name of Brian Setencich.
The account goes that Willie, a veteran in the political process, advised him to wait, suggesting the Democrats would put up another Republican up as a “buffer” or “transitional speaker.” This would have the effect of protecting the candidate from the perception of association with Brown and of distancing him from the resultant demise of Republican leader Brulte.
The reader should keep in mind that, rather than representing the story as absolute truth in every detail, I have included it because it represents one source’s understanding of an event that would bear on the eventual outcome.
Notwithstanding, there were a few GOP Members who suggested they might support another Republican, but only if the success of such a replacement candidate could be assured. Thus the Democrats went back to the Republican Members they had previously considered in late November.
BERNIE RICHTER:
Republican businessman Bernie Richter of Chico was obviously the primary focus of their attention. Elected in 1992, he was no lame-duck Member, as he would not be forced out of the Assembly until 1998. While he was a conservative, Democrats respected him as a straightforward and honest man and he was not James Brulte, but there was a sticking point. Because Richter opposed affirmative action, it was dubious whether he could get united Democrat support.
Still, if a few members of the Republican caucus could be inclined to vote for him, he would win by putting together a bi-partisan consensus. Richter was willing to make a two-year deal with Democrats as Willie had done with Republicans when he was first elected speaker in 1980.
While he had supported the Republican leadership, he disagreed with their strategies, which included shutting down the California State Assembly until April and the practice of threat and punishment by recall. Republicans were convinced that Willie coveted re-winning the speakership, but Willie and the Democrats were absolutely prepared to elect Richter as speaker on January 4, when the Assembly reconvened.
JANUARY 1995
On January 3, the day before the Assembly session was set to reconvene, Richard Mountjoy told San Francisco Chronicle reporters Robert Gunnison and Greg Lucas that he was prepared to renounce his election to the state senate in order to block Willie Brown from remaining as Assembly speaker. From Election Day on November 8, his desire was to stay in the Assembly just long enough to help elect James Brulte, but he hadn’t planned for the stalemate. In December he had been criticized in his caucus for “casually strolling through the Assembly chamber” on the day the Republicans had fled the Capitol to the Hyatt.
Some thought he wanted to be held by Democrats and thrown out of the Assembly so he would be free to go over to the Senate. Thus the suggestion was that he had placed his personal desire to be a senator over the goals of the party. Even if such an assertion were true, he mitigated Republican concerns by vowing to fight Willie even if it meant losing his senate seat. It is noteworthy however, that while he said he was “prepared” to renounce the senate seat, he did not in any way renounce it.
While he may have been adamant to fellow Members and reporters, he was vague in his public statement in which he said, “The best thing I can do for my district is prevent Willie Brown from being speaker.” In the same interview, he posed a question, but left it unanswered,
Is being called a state senator more immediately important than keeping Willie Brown from the speakership?[lxviii]
Only he could answer the question. It was a question he would have to answer in time. In perhaps the worst criticism ever published of a California legislator by a California legislator, Richard Mountjoy went on to offer,
Willie Brown is a corrupt politician. There is no other way to say it.[lxix]
According to the sequel, Mountjoy never did renounce his senate seat. If he had, he alone would have successfully thwarted Willie Brown and the Democrats, leaving them void of options they would later exercise to their benefit.
ON THE RICHTER SCALE
The Assembly Republicans did not attend the Thursday floor session on January 5. Instead, they caucused at the Hyatt Regency across the street, fearful that Willie and Democrats would act to disqualify Mountjoy and re-elect Willie as speaker. It was during this week that Bernie Richter publicly announced to Republican colleagues his desire to be speaker while objecting to the idea of a “shared speakership.”
Naturally, Brulte allies reacted with rancor, their very preeminence and power base within the caucus seeming threatened by another Republican candidate for speaker. Further, they suspected that Willie Brown and the Democrats put up Richter to challenging Brulte’s leadership.
Consequently, the Chico Republican was verbally assaulted within the caucus and publicly accused by Larry Bowler and Trice Harvey on a radio talk show program in his district of “pimping” for Willie Brown. Indicative of Republican contempt for the idea of Richter’s candidacy and the resultant suspicion, Bowler would say to the Sacramento Bee, “In the past month, a number of Democrats have been probing into our caucus to see if there’s a way to divide us. Probably six people were approached, but Richter was the only one who capitulated.”
Relations within the Republican caucus, however, were far from rosy, as there were more than a few Members who disagreed with the methods and positions of Brulte’s leadership. One of these Members, according to Bernie Richter, was Richard Mountjoy. Richter would later relate,
Mountjoy came into my office and was disdainful of his own leadership. He expressed real concern about their character, and about their veracity… and used a lot of swear words to express it. But he never expressed those views in caucus. In fact, he supported them [the leadership].
Richter complained that it was difficult to express a divergent opinion in a caucus controlled by hard-liners who harshly criticized any view that challenged their own. Yet Richter and Mountjoy were not the only Members in the caucus who criticized the leadership. A loyal-GOP freshman caucus Member told me in a resentful tone that the leadership wanted him to shut up and vote the way he was told to vote.
This Member, like Mountjoy, didn’t dare attempt to express any opposition to the leadership within the caucus for fear of costly repercussions. According to Richter, in early January, there were at least five Members within that caucus who were ready to endorse him as their new leader. Add at least 36 of the 39 Democrat votes and Bernie Richter would have the 41 votes required to become speaker.
But what deal had Richter made with Democrats in order to get such a plurality of their support? Pursuant to an agreement he would seal, Republicans and Democrats would split resources and committee chairmanships, but Republicans would get one extra seat on 18 of 26 policy committees.
Thus Republican speaker Richter would have ideological control of the Assembly. In exchange for their support, the Democrats would have half the chairmanships in a two-year deal, rendering a recall of Paul Horcher meaningless in terms of Assembly leadership. Democrats would also be able to retain key staff and resources.
Yet most of all, in electing Richter as speaker, Willie and the Democrats would strike a major blow to James Brulte as an effective leader in shattering his hopes and ambition to become speaker. If it seems dubious that Willie and Democrats were intent on undermining and destroying Brulte’s leadership, then
Willie’s public comments in early January need only be examined. Careful not to publicly criticize the Republican leader in December as power-sharing negotiations were going on, Willie suggested in early January that Brulte had erroneously pictured himself as “the Newt Gingrich of California,” that he had unwisely adopted the “no-deal” philosophy of the new Republican speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives.
When, in November 1994 the Republicans won a majority of the seats in the House, Gingrich made it his public policy not to make any deals for support. He wanted to be speaker free and clear, owing his position to no person or group. Mr. Gingrich was elected Speaker of the House on December 5, the same day that Mr. Brulte saw the speakership slip away.
Willie suggested that Brulte, unwilling to deal with Horcher, Democrats or even moderate Republicans, wanted to be Newt Gingrich. But Gingrich, Willie added, had a larger margin and was not in need of every vote in the Republican caucus.
James Brulte, for whatever strategy he had adopted, had failed on December 5, and the failure itself served to undermine the faith some of the Members had in their leader. Willie’s criticism was meant to underscore Brulte’s inability to effectively manage and lead his own caucus, let alone the splintered and fractious Assembly of the State of California. In the meantime, Bernie Richter along with Democrat Phil Isenberg, pressed the issue of his candidacy before skeptical Members on both sides.
SUSPICION
Distrusting Willie Brown all along, James Brulte and his supporters considered Richter’s candidacy evidence of duplicity and betrayal on Brown’s part. They knew that even as Willie bargained with them on a power-sharing agreement, he was an instrumentalist if not the composer or orchestrator of the Richter speakership bid. Yet even as Willie indicated that Richter was acting on his own in conjunction with Democrat Members other than himself, Brulte backed of all negotiations, commenting,
This was the first time in two years with him where we had reached an agreement and he either couldn’t or didn’t keep it. This gave me great pause… The level of trust wasn’t there.[lxx]
But the suspicion was double-edged, as Willie had his own misgivings about GOP intentions. In the background loomed the Horcher recall and a recall threat against Mike Machado. Certainly, any recall attempt would be bolstered by a sense of disorder and chaos in Sacramento. Thus the threat by Republicans to shut down the House until April became significant to Brown.
In such an environment, voters could be convinced that their support of the recalls was necessary to force the stalled California Assembly to action. If Brulte’s true intention was to create an atmosphere of “total chaos and non-function in Sacramento,” then his part in the power-sharing discussions was no less precarious than that of his rival.
As the days of January trailed by, the level of suspicion between Republicans and Democrats grew more profound. Republicans, who caucused in the Assembly Rules Committee room, feared Democrats were listening to their discussions. As a result, Larry Bowler climbed onto a table in the room and severed intercom wires with a small pocketknife.
Democrats were no less worried about listening devices and openly considered sweeping their room for Republican bugs. Meanwhile, the dialogue ceased, causing each side to explore other options. Brulte and minions could simply sit back and wait for the Horcher recall, but that would mean no Assembly business until April. In the absence of negotiation, Willie and Democrats were left with three options:
1) With Willie presiding, they could move again and oust Mountjoy from the Assembly
This radical step could only be used as a last option and was only an option if Mountjoy demurred from renouncing his senate seat to fight against Willie in the Assembly. Yet it was an option that some Democrats enthusiastically embraced while others warned against its lack of precedence and possible repercussions with voters.
2) They could elect a Republican of their choice as speaker rather than Brulte
They had considered this option even as early as mid-November 1994. In January 1995, the entire Democrat caucus looked seriously toward speaker candidate Bernie Richter and the deal he offered. By Thursday, January 19, Democrats openly signaled that they had chosen a Richter-as-speaker option, but both sides knew Democrats could not elect a speaker without help from a few Republicans.
3) They could do both
THE NUMBERS:
The Democrat caucus numbered 39 plus one independent [Horcher] who would vote with them, or 40. It would seem that with their votes and the vote of Richter [for himself], they would have no problem electing their compromise Republican speaker with 41 votes, but this was not the case.
First, whether he would abide by it or not, Richter had said publicly that “never in a million years” would he be the only Republican to vote for himself. This meant he would have to get at least 42 votes—the entire Democrat caucus, himself and at least one other Republican.
But many Democrats in the caucus had fundamental problems with his candidacy based on his position on the California Civil Rights Initiative of 1996, which would abolish affirmative action in the state.
Black and Latino Members took greatest exception, yet they were joined by other Members who believed they could not with good conscience elect a speaker who advocated eliminating affirmative action in California. Many weighed Richter’s civil rights position in the balance against an Assembly controlled by Brulte and conservatives and decided Richter’s election as speaker would be the lesser of the two evils.
However, in the end it became clear that Richter had the support of only 37 Democrats plus Horcher. Black Caucus chairperson Barbara Lee, a woman who represented the largely-black Oakland area, and Robert Campbell, a white Member representing counties in the San Francisco Bay area, both indicated that they would not vote for Richter as speaker.
This meant that Richter would need at least three Republican votes beside his own.
THE PRESSURE MOUNTS:
The Senate, with Bill Lockyer as its President, was still controlled by Democrats. During January, it was rumored that the Senate Rules Committee would begin to consider whether to declare Richard Mountjoy’s seat vacant. He had, after all, suggested that he would renounce the seat. Concerned about losing his senate seat, Mountjoy reassessed his options and went to the one man who could make things happen in the Assembly.
In a phone call to his “corrupt” colleague to ask if Democrats were serious about making Richter speaker, Mountjoy suggested to Willie that while he could not himself vote for Richter because of his own position and the politics of the senate seat, he might help with other Republican votes. The call served to confirm what Willie already knew: that Mountjoy would not renounce the seat.
Armed with this secret, Willie had an option he needed as the action built to a climax. He had the option of playing the Mountjoy card: if the Richter speakership failed for the lack of Republican support, then Willie having exercised all his options, could move to oust Richard Mountjoy and re-assume the speakership with 40 votes [only 40 votes are required if the Assembly numbers 79].
With each day that passed, Democrats grew more anxious to resolve the speakership issue one way or another. Whether the resolution was a power-sharing arrangement, the election of compromise candidate Bernie Richter, or the ousting of Richard Mountjoy and subsequent election of a Democrat, they were ready to act, but they clearly would not support James Brulte whose supporters threatened “scorched-earth” policies.
The Republicans blamed the non-function of the Assembly on the Democrats, asserting Democrats had “stolen the election” in December, committing “the equivalent of jury tampering” in the House. Further, they declared Democrats had “circumvented the will of the people” in thwarting the election of a Republican speaker in a majority-Republican House. Republican leadership thus absolved, they could sit and wait until April and let angry voters punish Paul Horcher and Democrats targeted in recalls. If the Republicans were ready to wait things out, then it was incumbent on Democrats to act.
Resolution came on January 23. At 11:00 a.m., the Assembly met briefly before parties separated to attend caucus sessions. Because there was some disagreement on shutting down the Assembly within the Republican caucus, they voted by secret ballot on whether to discontinue negotiations with Democrats and wait for the results of the Horcher recall.
Regardless of the outcome, which was never made public, Brulte was appropriately concerned about Republican Member Richard Mountjoy. In the event that the caucus decided to shut the Assembly down for three months, there was a question on whether Mountjoy would forego his political career, a question on whether he was willing to be stripped of his senate seat to enhance Brulte’s position. After all, there was little Brulte could offer Mountjoy in the Assembly. As Assembly speaker he could not grant Mountjoy a seat in the senate.
Shortly after the caucus session, Brulte spoke with Willie, and he remembered saying,
If you’re going to elect Richter, do it. If you’re going to throw Mountjoy out and elect yourself, do it. If you’re going to negotiate in good faith, do that. I think you are gaming us. It’s time to put an end to the game.[lxxi]
But politics itself is a game with its set of players and unique rules. It is a game that Willie played better than anyone in California. While Brulte and supporters followed a carefully conceived plan, they were suspicious and frustrated with Willie and Democrats who played options on various vicissitudes.
Purposefully, Willie and Democrats had afforded themselves the option of any one of three moves as discussed earlier. During a conversation between Brown and Brulte as commented on and published by the Sacramento Bee in February 1995, Willie essentially would say to his opponent, “I’ve shown you the board. Your move.” According to Willie,
I said, “Jim, are you telling me further talks are a waste of time?” He said, “Yes.” I said, “OK, I’ve never blindsided you. We’re going to put Richter up and elect him, and I think the votes are there to throw Mountjoy out.” He said, “OK, thanks for the heads-up, friend,” and went about his business absolutely convinced that we would do neither.
Once Brulte indicated that further negotiations were moot, Willie generally decided his course of action and had described it to the Republican leader up-front.
FLOOR SHOW II: VARIATIONS ON A THEME
With Senior Member of the Assembly Willie Brown presiding in lieu of the chief clerk, this second part of the speakership battle took a completely different tone. Many capitol insiders did not expect anything to happen short of introduction of bills and meetings relating to shared power.
A good part of the focus was on a noticeably emaciated Bernie Richter [he had lost 16 pounds] who had put himself as a compromise candidate for the office of speaker. The greatest interest, however, was on Willie and what he would do. Unlike the December 5th session, which had been opened shortly after noon by chief clerk Dotson Wilson, this January 23rd session was convened after 6 p.m. by Willie Brown.
Absent were the families of Members who had witnessed the swearing-in ceremony. Absent were the spectators and professional prognosticators who had waited many years to see Willie Brown publicly dumped by the triumphant Republicans. Absent was the general interest of the public, the smugness of Republicans and the nervousness of Democrats as all sides awaited the uncertain albeit exciting outcome.
On January 23 however, both parties had choreographed their moves and had carefully scripted their questions and responses.
Still at issue was Government Code Section 9023, which called for the election of a speaker prior to any other business. In an attempt to simplify the proceedings which were convoluted, and which seemed almost absurd at times, I have set aside each action and response and numbered each according to chronology.
1) When the Assembly was reassembled at 5:45 p.m., the first motion came from law professor Byron Sher of Palo Alto, the exact motion he had made on December 5: “that Assembly Member Richard Mountjoy is not duly elected and qualified to be an Assembly Member representing the 59th Assembly District and therefore is not eligible to participate in the business of the Assembly.”
2) Even before the motion could be seconded, freshman Republican Member Howard Kaloogian rose to a Point of Order stating that, according to Government Code Section 9023, the chief clerk Dotson Wilson should be presiding. Without any deliberation or reservation, Willie ruled the point of order not well taken.
3) Next, Republican parliamentarian Ross Johnson rose, pointing out that, according to the provisions of Government Section Code 9023 and consistent with the chief clerk’s ruling on December 5, the motion by Democrat Member Sher was out of order. Forthrightly, Willie ruled against Republican Johnson.
4) Undaunted by the ruling, Mr. Johnson next moved to amend Mr. Sher’s motion to include a statement that Assembly Members Horcher and Machado were not duly elected and qualified to represent their respective districts. He then asked if Members Horcher and Machado would be allowed to vote on his motion to amend Mr. Sher’s motion, and Willie ruled Horcher and Machado ineligible to vote on such a motion.
5) Democrat Member John Burton moved to amend the motion to further state that Republican Members Johnson, Pringle, Brulte, Bowler, and Harvey were not duly elected and qualified to represent their respective districts and therefore are not eligible to participate in the business of the Assembly.
6) In a Point of Order, Member Burton suggested that Members Horcher and Machado should be able to vote on Mr. Johnson’s amendment and his own amendment, but not on the issue on their own eligibility. Willie agreed.
7) Next was a challenge to Willie’s authority as presiding Member by Republican Jan Goldsmith of Poway who asserted that, according to Mason’s Manual, a temporary presiding officer had not been elected, and thus Willie had no power to preside. Naturally, presiding Member Willie Brown disagreed.
8) Running out of impediments to the inevitable ousting of Richard Mountjoy, Ross Johnson rose again to declare that, according to the Government Code, the chief clerk rather than Willie should be presiding. Willie, however reaffirmed his previous ruling [see #2 above].
9) If the original motion could not become any more convoluted, Mr. Johnson next moved to accept Mr. Burton’s motion to amend his own motion which amended Mr. Sher’s motion, but he wanted a further amendment to Mr. Burton’s motion to state that Assembly Members Vasconcellos and Willie Brown were not duly qualified and elected and therefore not eligible to participate in the business of the Assembly. As senior Member of the Assembly, Willie ruled that “no amendment to an amendment may be amended.”
10) A vote was taken on the Burton amendment to render ineligible members Johnson, Pringle, Brulte, Bowler, and Harvey. Lacking a majority of all Members present and voting, the amendment lost 40-40 with voting straight down party lines. “Independent” Paul Horcher sided with the Democrats.
11) A vote was taken on the Johnson amendment to render ineligible members Horcher and Machado. Lacking a majority of all Members present and voting, the amendment lost 40-40. Quite clearly, the Assembly was hopelessly deadlocked. Unless in one way or another the numbers could be changed, the House would be trapped in total non-function. Republicans hoped to alter the numbers through recall efforts, but Willie and Democrats had a much more expedient plan.
12) For the first time since the session began, James Brulte rose to a parliamentary inquiry, asking “Is not a majority of the Members present and voting required to sustain a decision by the Chair?” Willie indicated that any appeal to a decision by the chair would have to carry a majority of Members present and voting. In the event of a tie, any appeal would be lost. With the numbers as they were, appeals to any of Willie’s rulings would be useless.
13) The next logical question raised by Member Johnson in effect was, “How many votes would be required to carry Mr. Sher’s motion [to oust Mr. Mountjoy from the Assembly]?” Willie ruled that Mr. Sher’s motion would only require 40 votes, suggesting that, with respect to the specific motion, 40 votes would be a majority.
This obviously meant that Willie planned to reverse the decision of the chief clerk and would disallow Richard Mountjoy from voting on the question. Thus at that moment, Willie had proven to previously skeptical Republicans that there was nothing to stop him if he wanted to have Mountjoy ousted from the House and have himself re-elected as Speaker, but ousting a Member was such a radical step. He had made his point to Republicans on what he could do.
Now he would demonstrate to Democrats that the Republicans did not want and would have no resolution to the deadlock even if Democrats conceded to the election of a Republican Speaker. Republican unwillingness to elect even a Republican Speaker would suggest hidden, possibly malevolent motives and would justify a Mountjoy ouster.
DIVERSION
14) In behalf of the Democrats, Debra Bowen of Marina Del Rey offered a substitute motion, a motion that would allow the Assembly to vote on a set of House rules and on the election of Bernie Richter to the Office of Speaker of the Assembly rather than proceed with a vote on the motion by Byron Sher. Ms. Bowen’s motion was seconded by Mike Machado.
Meanwhile Democrats behind the scenes, still counting their votes for Richter, had mustered 37 votes from a caucus of 39. Paul Horcher’s vote would make 38. As expected, Barbara Lee and Robert Campbell indicated they could not help elect a speaker who had campaigned for an end to affirmative action. A Richter speakership would need three more votes.
In the Republican camp, Richter believed he technically had the three – his own, the vote of freshman Brett Granlund of Yuciapa and the vote of freshman Brian Setencich of Fresno. For some of this information, I relied on an interesting piece by John Jacobs printed on February 5 in the Sacramento Bee.
Jacobs suggested that, unknown to Brulte and his circle, two freshmen had pledged to vote for Richter if he had the support of the 39 Democrats, plus Horcher, or 40 votes. It might be inferred that Members Granlund and Setencich were privately at odds with the Brulte leadership and were ready to support another Republican for speaker.
But as it became known that Willie had only secured 38 votes, Richter began to worry about his Republican support. Not wanting to expose his supposed supporters to the wrath of Brulte’s clan, he exited the Assembly floor and had the sergeant-at-arms direct Granlund and Setencich to private phone booths where he called each.
Richter indicated that Granlund then backed off, suggesting he could vote to support Richter, but he would not cast or have the perception of casting the deciding 41st vote. Without Granlund, Setencich’s vote was pointless as it would increase the number to only 40 rather than 41.
Finally abandoning his speakership bid, Bernie Richter returned to the floor and went to the podium to inform Willie. Sadly, Richter had, like many before him, underestimated Willie Brown, and it was this and perhaps another misapprehension that cost him the speakership.
To the surprise of both caucuses, Willie had somehow managed to get Barbara Lee and Robert Campbell to change their minds and vote for Richter – he had delivered 40 votes. But because Richter had however, in his words “released” Granlund and Setencich from their commitments for support, it was unclear whether he would have their support and perhaps too difficult to pull them off the floor again.
There is however, a variation on this episode as told to me by Brett Granlund later. Assembly Member Granlund told me he and Setencich had merely agreed to listen to Richter’s plan but that neither had ever committed to vote for Richter as speaker. To the contrary, he said both had given written commitments promising support to Brulte, adding,
The story in the Bee by Jacobs was wrong.[lxxii] He [Jacobs] never asked me what happened. He never called me.
According to Granlund, Richter had misapprehended the agreement to meet as an agreement for support, and he had erroneously reported to Willie and the press based on this overly optimistic but wrong assumption. If Granlund’s version is the more accurate of the two, then Richter, in illogically translating willingness to talk as support and/or a voting pledge, made the same mistake Brulte had made on December 5.
Granlund recalled telling him, when speaking with Richter on his cellular phone from the Assembly floor that day,
“You don’t have my support. You never had my support. If you want to be speaker with you as the 41st vote, go right ahead, but you don’t have my vote.”
Thus when Richter went to the podium, he informed Willie that he had released Granlund and Setencich from their commitments, though in truth the commitments were never made. Such was the way Granlund told the story.
To me, Granlund’s version seemed more consistent with the dynamics of the scene and the numerical consideration of the proposed vote. The inconsistency noted in the Richter version as reported in the Sacramento Bee had been immediately obvious:
If Richter had truly had Granlund and Setencich, then why, after Willie told him Barbara Lee and Robert Campbell had decided to support him [bringing Democrat support plus Horcher to 40 votes], why did he not go back to Granlund and Setencich to tell them that they could have come on as the 42nd and 43rd votes, that neither of the two would be casting the deciding 41st. If Granlund had backed out on him, why did he not pursue the speakership with Setencich’s support? With 43 or even 42 votes, Richter’s actions would have been consistent with his only stipulation. He would not have been the only Republican to vote for himself.
Whether he never had Granlund and Stetencich or they had nervously shifted support, on the bottom line, Richter did not have the votes. Willie naturally, was only interested in the answers to two questions:
1) Do you have the other Republican votes you said were committed to you? and
2) If you don’t have the votes, are you willing to become speaker by casting the only Republican to vote for you?
For Richter, it was the moment of truth – he did not have the votes. At once perceiving Richter’s mistake and the inescapable reality that Richter was conceding, Willie concluded, “Now I have to play the Mountjoy card.”
Still there was the substitute motion by Debra Bowen, which would allow the Assembly to vote on a set of House rules and on the election of Bernie Richter as speaker. It had been seconded and a vote was forthcoming. Richter could have become speaker at that moment– he could have been the 41st vote to carry the motion and the 41st vote for himself to be elected speaker.
Nevertheless, his words from earlier had come back to haunt him. He had said, “never in a million years” would he be speaker if he had to cast the only Republican vote. They were his own words, and there was no rationale that would explain any contradiction. Therefore, when Democrat Joe Baca of Rialto asked the Chair if Richter was a candidate for Speaker of the Assembly, Richter reaffirmed to the membership that he was not a candidate if he was the 41st vote. This final attempt having failed, Debra Bowen withdrew her motion.
15) Rising for yet another parliamentary inquiry, Member Johnson asked, “Is not an affirmative vote of 41 votes required to determine the qualification of a Member pursuant to the Rules?” Willie replied that, because Mountjoy would be unable to vote on the motion to consider his own qualification, only the 79 eligible Members would vote and 40 would represent the majority required to carry the motion. Johnson immediately made a motion to appeal the Chair’s decision, but Willie’s decision was sustained by a vote of 40-40.
16) Finally came the vote on Byron Sher’s motion to disqualify Richard Mountjoy from the Assembly. The motion carried on a 40-39 margin with Mountjoy ineligible to vote.
Immediately Ross Johnson moved to reconsider Sher’s motion on the next legislative day, but he would later waive his own motion. Angry to the point of trembling, Mr. Johnson threatened certain and wrathful retribution. Thus after forty-nine days of point/counterpoint from both sides, the Democrats had finally achieved their aim: Richard Mountjoy had been disqualified from the Assembly and, more than merely negating a Republican majority, Democrats were in position to once again assume control of the House.
According to tradition, Democrat Member John Vasconcellos nominated Willie Brown for the Office of Speaker of the Assembly, but even before the nomination could be seconded, the Democrats wanted to caucus in order to discuss options. The Assembly recessed for this purpose at 8:21 p.m.
INSIDE THE DEMOCRAT CAUCUS
With the numerical advantage in the House, the Democrats could elect a Speaker, but just who would their Speaker be? While Willie Brown seemed like the obvious choice, there were certain short and long run disadvantages to re-electing a man the Republicans had cast as evil incarnate in the Assembly and the State of California.
In order to elect him, every Democrat would have to vote for him. Mike Machado’s vote for Willie could be used against him in Republican recall efforts afoot whereas a vote for a compromise candidate would not necessarily have the same effect.
The situation would be similar though less drastic for Democrats in “threatened or endangered” districts like Joe Baca and Debra Bowen. Even if the recall threats against the two were without serious foundation, some conjectured that angry voters might punish Democrats in 1996 for re-electing Brown as speaker. Certainly, the Republicans would play upon such an action.
The name of a compromise candidate was proffered: attorney Phil Isenberg of Sacramento, a former aide to Willie and a name central to Democrat leadership. On the other hand, the entire Republican leadership was “endangered” by term-limits. Members Knowles, Johnson, Harvey and Brulte would not be around to cause problems in 1996.
Only Bowler and Pringle would be left. The Democrats as well as Republicans esteemed Bowler’s ability at leadership much less than Brulte’s, and that left Pringle who, first elected in 1988, was defeated by Tom Umberg in 1990 and sat out a term.
This meant that, re-elected in another district in 1992, Pringle could remain in the Assembly until 1998. It would be Pringle who would wage the war against Democrats in 1996, but he would no doubt be supported by senatorial colleagues Johnson and Brulte who would surely move over.
When Isenberg finally got his turn to speak, he said,
If you think you want to go into the battle Ross Johnson just announced, scorched earth and all, why go in with someone like me? You would be crazy not to go in with your best. Of course he’s pig-headed. Of course he’s impossible, but he’s the best we’ve got.
Thus the matter was settled. The Democrats still had an option, albeit remote, to elect Richter or anyone else in the Assembly as speaker, but Willie had already made his point. As a leader, he had united the entire Democrat caucus and had been prepared to deliver the votes to make someone other than himself the speaker. This was no easy task for any caucus, as the various Members had independent interests that often pitted moderates against liberals and sometimes both sides against the middle.
Notwithstanding, Willie had brought them all together on their selection of a speaker and related policy—first in December and later in January. Still, even if they had the votes to elect Willie, uncomfortable Members were appeased as the caucus discussed a new set of rules in the House which would greatly reduce the Speaker’s power and implement a viable power-sharing arrangement with Republicans.
Under these new rules, the caucuses rather than the Speaker would select committee chairs, vice-chairs and members. Further, the Assembly would have 26 committees with chairmanships divided evenly between the two parties. The Rules Committee rather than the Speaker would control spending for staff, office space and other legislative expenses.
Thus determined to re-elect Willie Brown as Speaker, reform the speakership and re-organize the House, Democrats re-entered the chamber as the session reconvened at 12:39 a.m. [Almost 40 minutes past midnight, it had become Tuesday January 24, a new calendar day]
BACK TO THE FLOOR
17) The nomination of Willie by John Vasconcellos was seconded by Members Baca and Hudson who spoke much the way they had on the first day of session. The die already cast, Ross Johnson stood to nominate Jim Brulte. The symbolic nomination was seconded by Member Agiuar who had done the same in December.
18) The clerk called roll and Willie Brown was re-elected as Speaker for a record eighth term with 40 votes—those of the united Democrats and the single independent, Paul Horcher. For many, the most enduring image from the night was Ross Johnson, smoldering and shivering with anger, like white-haired Moses who had come down from the mountain with tablets in hand to witness unthinkable debauchery and irreverence. Johnson prophesied of the Democrats, quoting from the lesser biblical prophet Hosea, “They have sown the wind. So shall they reap the whirlwind!” [Hosea 8:7]
19) Immediately after clerk Dotson Wilson administered the oath of office to his long-time friend Willie Brown, Democrat Members Bowen and Machado submitted House Resolution No.10 which reformed the speakership and reorganized the Assembly. This resolution for the entire 95-96 session could only be amended by another resolution adopted by an affirmative recorded vote of 54 Members.
The resolution was adopted with 41 “aye” votes. Brett Granlund of Yucaipa was the sole Republican to support the resolution. While 11 Republicans voted against the measure, the majority abstained from voting. The session was adjourned at 1:53 a.m.
SPIN ALLEY
Most Californians had slept through the prodigious Assembly session and the re-election of Willie Brown as Speaker for a record-breaking eighth time, but it would be one of the biggest stories of the day as reported in the newspapers and on local news. Nationally, CNN would report the result. The biggest television story on January 24 however, was the beginning of opening statements in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson. Related to Willie’s re-election as Speaker, the following statements would be reported in the newspapers:
CRITICISM OF REPUBLICANS:
Willie Brown: Newt ruined the thinking capacity of the Republicans in this House. The assumption of their right to win is what fueled the defeat for them. They never stopped to look at reality, and reality was 40 to 40.
Inside source: The Republicans played with only one agenda. They said “Either do things our way or we’re sitting things out and waiting for the Horcher recall in April.”
CRITICISM OF THE PROCESS:
Ruth Holton [Executive director of Common Cause in Sacramento]: People did not elect Assembly members to be fighting among themselves, and the longer it goes on, the more disgusted people get. This entire spectacle keeps adding fuel to the real cynicism that people have for government.
Democrat Assembly Member Byron Sher: What the voters had in mind when they went to the polls is for the Assembly to get on with the business of the state, to stop partisan fights. Voters didn’t want us to engage in difficult and partisan rhetoric.
CRITICISM OF WILLIE BROWN:
Republican Leader James Brulte: Once Mr. Brown had the gavel, he could overturn any ruling that he chose… a blatant and corrupt use of power.
Republican Assembly Member Larry Bowler: Willie Brown and his band of hoodlums installed a junta with the same ruthless disregard for democracy and the American tradition that has enabled dictators around the world to claim illegitimate power.
CRITICISM OF THE PROPOSED REFORM OF THE SPEAKERSHIP:
Willie Brown: Yes, you’re looking at a different speaker, a totally different speaker. This office will never be the same as it was under my speakership. The power is going to be in the Rules Committee.
James Brulte: Do you really think the Democrats’ adopted rules that don’t give Willie any power? Give me a break!
Ruth Holton of California Common Cause: There will never be another speaker with the power of Willie Brown.
CRITICISM OF THE EJECTION OF RICHARD MOUNTJOY FROM THE ASSEMBLY:
Willie Brown: We were genuinely trying to do Bernie Richter. The Mountjoy option was something we had never planned on.
Republican Assembly Member Ross Johnson [to Democrats
on the floor as he declared war]: You expelled a duly qualified member of this
House. The legacy you leave for this House – which could have been a positive,
positive legacy – I’m afraid what you will leave is a well that is so poisoned
that it may be years before the damage is undone.
ACT III
THE HORCHER RECALL
The recall had been organized even before December 5 and was at full speed less than two weeks after Horcher cast the landmark vote for Brown which deadlocked the Assembly and denied Republicans the first opportunity to control the House in twenty-five years. Nevertheless, the recall process did not move as quickly as Republicans had hoped.
According to recall campaign spokesman Jim Camp, the required 18,761 signatures had been turned in to the Secretary of State in early February, but the signatures could not be certified because a restraining order existed pending several legal challenges to the recall itself. On Thursday, March 2, this order was lifted in a Los Angeles Superior Court and a judge rejected further challenges, allowing the recall to proceed. Without delay, Governor Pete Wilson set the Election Day for Tuesday, May 16.
Both sides took the recall seriously, a recall that was almost certain to succeed from the start. While Paul Horcher optimistically asserted that the district was evenly split along party lines, it was a district with a reliable record for supporting the prevailing GOP agenda.
Voters in the district composed of Diamond Bar, West Covina, La Habra Heights, Walnut and Rowland Heights had supported George Bush over Bill Clinton in 1992, Michael Huffington over Dianne Feinstein in 1994, Pete Wilson over Kathleen Brown in 1994 and Paul Horcher over Democrat opponent Andrew Ramirez in the November 8, 1994 election. Many in the district were angry and not without reasonable motivation: in November the majority had elected a Republican who would declare himself an “Independent” in December.
To angry voters who felt betrayed, Horcher’s decision to change affiliation was materially significant to the election itself and thus a review or recall was not unreasonable. Willie countered that the recall as an instrument was not purposed to punish the individual voting record of an elected official, but rather the recall was purposed as a redress for voters whose representative was guilty or who had been convicted of some significant indiscretion or criminal behavior.
Apparently, either voters in Assembly District 60 did not buy the argument or they believed they had been betrayed by their representative who had switched allegiances, because early polls suggested the recall would be successful.
Perhaps a more interesting scenario would have been one in which Paul Horcher had voted for Willie Brown but remained a Republican, giving opponents significantly less ground on which to base a recall. In any event, Republicans statewide concentrated on the recall effort as contributions flowed in from Presidential hopeful Pete Wilson, the Assembly Republican leadership, the State Republican Party, and individual Republicans whose hopes of seeing Willie Brown unceremoniously dumped had been thwarted by Horcher’s December 5 vote. Busload after busload of canvassers poured into the district week after week to remind voters of Horcher’s defection and its significance.
On the other side, Willie and Democrats headed south to Diamond Bar to help the man who had saved their hopes of meaningful inclusion in state government. Led by consultant Phil Giarrizzo, they targeted Democrats in the district and stressed the importance of support for the new “Independent,” but there were some reluctant Democrats in the area who resented the fact that Willie had not supported their own candidate against Republican Horcher in the November 8th election.
It was obvious the Republicans were clearly more effective in their campaign as the May 16 recall election approached. When I spoke with Paul Horcher in his district in early May, he seemed very tired and almost “beaten.” However, when I spoke with him again on election day in Sacramento, he was upbeat as he told me he had no regrets about becoming an independent and declared he would have “a happy ending.”
On May 16, voters from the 60th Assembly District voted 62.6% to 37.4% in favor of recalling Horcher. As of that day, he was no longer a Member in the State Assembly. His replacement was Republican Gary Miller who received 39.5% of votes in the district. Sworn in immediately, Miller was one more vote for Brulte.
THE NUMBERS
Paul Horcher’s defeat and Gary Miller’s vote would change the number in the Assembly to 39 Democrats and 39 Republicans, with two seats vacant. Naturally, Richard Mountjoy’s 59th district seat was vacant
[the election had been set for June 6]
, but the other vacancy, the 72nd district seat which belonged to Republican Ross Johnson had a more profound significance.
In the spring of 1995, Senator Marian Bergeson of Newport Beach was elected to the Orange County board of Supervisors. She left the Senate immediately. As the reality of term limits loomed in the minds of many Assembly members who constantly looked to the Senate, the resultant vacant seat got the instant attention of Doris Allen of Cypress.
Ross Johnson, however, believed that his Republican colleague had no automatic right to the seat, and he challenged her for it. For both, it was possibly the only opportunity to extend political life. At some time, the matter came before the Republican caucus, and the caucus endorsed Johnson, who had to move into the district to run, over Allen, the caucus’ most senior member.
Finally fed up with the leadership, Doris Allen then declared herself a candidate for the office of Speaker of the Assembly in opposition to James Brulte, even suggesting publicly that she would never vote for him. Johnson won the 35th senatorial seat, and Allen, jilted, essentially abandoned the Republican caucus who had abandoned her in the matter. Thus even after the Horcher recall, Brulte and the Republicans could muster no more than 38 votes for a speaker.
DORIS ALLEN
She was born in May 1936 in Kansas City, Missouri and attended college at the University of Wyoming before coming to Westminster, California in 1960 and completing her education at Long Beach Community College and the Hallmark Business School. Her father was a police officer who was a descendent of American revolutionary Samuel Adams. In Long Beach, she was co-owner of a lighting business and trustee of the Huntington Beach Union School District before winning an election to the Assembly in 1982. She and husband Jim had two children, but they eventually divorced.
After thirteen years of sacrifices made for political life, she was unwilling to sit, waiting for term limits to force her out. As senior member of the Republican caucus, moderate Allen often differed with hard-line conservatives who dominated the Assembly GOP caucus. She neither supported recalls as a tool for political retribution nor the partisan war that was escalating on a daily basis.
While she had not chaired any committee previously with Democrats solidly in power, in January she was named to chair the Assembly Health Committee. Even there, she encountered problems—not from Democrats, but from Republicans on the Rules Committee who refused to refer a few key health care bills to her committee.
As Ross Johnson had taken the Senate seat she had coveted, she had little to lose by making a radical move.
Technically, the election of a Republican to fill Richard Mountjoy’s seat on June 5 would change the number to 40 Republicans and 39 Democrats. Consequently, there would be a showdown circa June 5 and Doris Allen would either have to “put-up or shut-up.” She would have a few options at her disposal:
1) Reject the Republicans in favor of Willie Brown
Apparently, she never even considered this option. Doris Allen was a Republican who would never vote for a Democrat rather than a Republican. Sources indicate that Democrats never even asked her to betray her party. They did however, attempt to persuade her to pursue other options.
2) Abstain from voting; withdraw from Speakership issue altogether
Choosing this option would result in an extension of the deadlock as the numbers would change to 39-39, with one abstaining. In such a scenario, Willie would remain as Speaker as Republicans would not have enough votes to remove him. Nevertheless, the playing of this option would likely result in A) The initiation of a Doris Allen recall, as recalls were the orders of the day for Republican leadership; and B) The eventual Assembly take-over by Republicans [40-39] on June 19 when Ross Johnson’s 72nd District seat was slated to be filled. Clearly, both Allen and the Democrats could not derive any long-term benefit by working such an option, and that left a final strategy.
3) With the help of Democrats, elect herself as Speaker
In principle, Willie Brown had done the exact thing in 1980 when he first won the speakership, triumphing over rival Howard Berman with the help of 28 needed Republican votes. Democrats willing, Doris Allen could cast the symbolic 41st vote to become Speaker and then proceed, as Willie had, with embracing her rivals, mending old wounds and dispensing chairmanships and favors in order to consolidate power.
She would never win over Brulte, Pringle, Bowler and other hard-liners, but if she could win over a few of the moderates and wavering Republicans, her speakership would become firmly established through the course of 1995 and into early 1996. While James Brulte suggested he personally would not pursue a recall against Allen if she won the speakership with Democrat help, there was no doubt that a recall would be forthcoming from other quarters.
Yet the grounds for such a recall would be dubious at best. In voting for herself, she would be after all supporting a Republican for Speaker and accomplishing what James Brulte and others for all their efforts could not. There would also be allegations made that she would be a “tool” or “puppet” for Willie Brown who would be turning screws and pulling strings from behind the scenes.
Nevertheless, if for a fact she was determined not to be an “instrument” of Willie Brown or anyone else, then she could dispel any such perception by the manner in which she exercised and defined the agenda, powers and duties of the speakership. Finally, she would have to determine how long she desired to be speaker as term-limits would force her out of the Assembly in 1996.
As an individual who cared about the institution, she would have to realize a transition period would be necessary. It would be callously self-serving and detrimental to the House for any term-limited Member to attempt to hold the speakership or a powerful committee chairmanship up to the point of being forced out of the Assembly.
Therefore, Doris Allen as Speaker would be required to lead the transition of power from the ranks of the experienced old guard to the eager hands of less-tenured Members. If perhaps she determined that this transition could best be achieved in nine months time, then prudence would require her to resign the office in early 1996.
The overall benefit of exposing herself to the dangers, resentments and criticisms associated with making such a bold move would be the distinction of having served as Speaker of the California Assembly, and the designation as Speaker or former Speaker would serve to define her for the rest of her life. In over twenty years, only two other persons had served in that capacity, though many had sought the speakership only to fail. In becoming Speaker, Doris Allen would be certain to extend her political life and carve out for herself a conspicuous place in California history.
The election of another Republican as Speaker would deal a mortal blow to the hopes and ambition of James Brulte. He would be ever after perceived by many as a remarkable Republican who had, albeit in the best possible circumstance in twenty-five years, allowed the speakership to slip from his hands. If he would ever bear distinction as a great leader, it would have to come in the Senate.
At least initially, he could challenge Doris Allen and work against her as she attempted to consolidate Republican support, but if she lasted through the summer, Brulte would have to consider resigning as Republican leader. In 1996, the caucus would need a leader who could focus in the fall on increasing the ranks of Assembly Republicans. Curt Pringle of Garden Grove would be his likely successor.
As the viability of a Doris Allen speakership became more apparent in April and May, stories of Curt Pringle as her rival and as a Republican compromise candidate for Speaker began to surface. Pringle had won the respect of more than a few Democrats in May as chairman of the Appropriations Committee
[formerly the Ways and Means Committee]
. While Brulte had been unsuccessful at garnering Democrat votes, if Pringle could manage one or two, he could be become Speaker.
But if the Democrats could not abide Brulte, they certainly would not support Pringle who was generally more conservative. In mid-to-late May, there were rumors of other GOP members putting together a coalition of Republicans and Democrats, but no such movement was able to gain momentum.
Brett Granlund of Yucaipa was the subject of some of the gossip and there were other names suggested. Youthful Brian Setencich of Fresno was said to be interested in the job and working on a plan. Nonetheless, there was another factor that figured prominently in the final scene.
MR. MAYOR?
Every April, Willie Brown typically took a trip to Washington D.C. with a delegation of other California legislators. Upon his return in 1995, I asked him about his sojourn. He had met twice with President Bill Clinton and had specific comments and criticism that I will not relate here. More importantly, he said he was seriously considering running for Mayor of San Francisco.
Certainly I had heard talk of such a possibility months before as Republicans constantly ribbed him about leaving the legislature. I heard Ross Johnson say with my own ears that he would eagerly walk precincts for Willie if he decided to run. But publicly Willie had wavered about pursuing the job and would not commit to any announcement of candidacy as winning the San Francisco mayorship would have significant financial consequences.
To Republicans and Democrats who urged him on, he flatly said, “I can’t afford the job as Mayor of San Francisco.” He answered in such a manner because the statues of the city charter require that the Mayor should have no other outside employment or income while running the city, this meaning he would have to abandon his lucrative legal practice.
The mayor’s salary in 1994 was $139,000 – he made nearly that amount as Speaker of the Assembly in the same year. Without the income from the law firm, he would have significantly less money to do the wonderful things and live the wonderful life. Thus publicly he held off making any announcement as he privately weighed the benefit against the sacrifice.
In reality, he had eyed the mayorship of San Francisco since early in the 1970s, but alterations in rules circa 1974-75 – the initiation of a December run-off –was enough to keep him in the Assembly. Then in early December of 1978, Willie’s close friend, San Francisco Mayor George Moscone was assassinated along with San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk by former San Francisco Supervisor Dan White.
White had resigned in November, complaining that he could not afford to support his wife and son on the $9,600 annual salary. When he took the job as Supervisor, he was forced to quit employment as a fireman due to a “conflict of interest” ruling by the city attorney. Embittered and by his own account “temporarily insane,” he gunned down Mayor Moscone because he was angry that the mayor had refused to appoint him as a Supervisor. Harvey Milk had strongly opposed his regaining his seat on the Board.
About that incident, Willie had said,
What really diminished my appetite for the mayorship was when George was killed. I really got negative on city politics and what city politics seemed to do to people.[lxxiii]
It seems he flirted with the idea again in 1988 while he was under siege and his speakership threatened by the “Gang of Five” [see Chapter 32], but when old friend Art Agnos indicated that he would seek the job, Willie backed off, redoubled his efforts in the November elections, and won enough seats in the Assembly to render the conspirators irrelevant. As late as March 1995, many believed he would move from the Assembly to the state senate seat occupied by Milton Marks who would be forced out by term-limits in 1996, but by late April, it seemed Willie would yield the seat to good friend John Burton.
Yet Willie would be forced from the Assembly by term limits in 1996—the same Willie Brown who absolutely loved politics and was too adept at the game to be left out of public service altogether for lack of planning. Thus when Willie suggested that he would not seek the senate seat, the notion that he was strongly considering the mayorship of San Francisco gained critical corroboration. Still Willie always liked to keep everyone guessing.
On the night I spoke with him in April, he was relaxed and thoughtful. He told me that soon he was going to “surprise everyone” and “sneak out of the Assembly.” He also said definitively that he would run for mayor of San Francisco. Apparently, even before the Washington D.C. trip he had decided what he would do, but not without great deliberation. Later he would say, “I went through a lot of agony making the determination to finally run for mayor.”
No doubt incumbent in his decision was the fact that more than a majority of the Board of Supervisors had asked or encouraged him to run. Further, Willie certainly knew that probably the best thing he could do for Democrat colleagues in the Assembly and their 1996 election chances was to “sneak out of the Assembly.”
But most of all, San Francisco was Willie’s city, a city he loved and called “one of the jewels of the world.” Being Mayor of San Francisco was what Willie Brown wanted.
Absolutely aware of the importance of numbers, did Speaker Willie Brown believe he could possibly “sneak out of the Assembly?” In May 1995, Democrats and Republicans stood deadlocked with 39 votes each and two vacancies, but a June 5th election would certainly bring in another Republican, giving the GOP a numerical advantage.
Democrats had lodged their hopes on a Republican compromise candidate, but unless this candidate could muster two or more votes from his or her own caucus, the Democrats would need the votes of all 39 Members. If Willie resigned from the Assembly, their number would shrink to 38 and perhaps all would be lost. His colleagues would be at the mercy of Brulte and legions, who had already lit the torches, poised to “scorch Democrat earth.”
Besides, in May more than ever the Democrats needed their leader, regardless of the circumstances, to limit the degree of certain losses and to put them in the best possible position for the rest of the session. While Willie would have to stay at least until June 5 and probably beyond, his role in the Assembly after the election would remain uncertain.
During the last few days of May, Willie told me that he was going to step down as Speaker of the Assembly within the week in order to announce his candidacy for Mayor of San Francisco. Studying his face and demeanor carefully, it was difficult for me to believe that the end of his tried, tested, proven and seemingly immortal speakership was so suddenly and so near at hand, but I knew immediately he was serious.
I remember wondering to myself, “How could he so calmly resign such a monumental speakership? A speakership he had worked so hard to develop and defend? A speakership that had truly taken on a life of its own and will occupy a place in California history?” Incredibly, I had been more willing to accept the end of his speakership in December, but he would not accept defeat in such a manner – he had surprised Republicans and most Californians on that December day and again in January when he was re-elected for a record eighth time.
However, within a little time I understood the nature and reason for his calmness. Since November, the numbers had been against Willie. The Republicans had finally got him. He could play with the Republicans for a while, but before mid-summer, one of them would be speaker.
Ultimately, the end of his speakership had been inevitable since in 1990 when California voters approved term-limits. Even if the Democrats had had the numerical advantage, mid-September 1995 to early-January 1996 would have spelled the end of his speakership as he would have passed it to a less-tenured Democrat.
A master of the game and consummate showman, Willie wanted to direct the final scene in the entertaining and significant political theatre that was his speakership. The finale would have to be a fitting conclusion to the action and life of the speakership itself, charged with all the mystery, intrigue, excitement and surprise that Californians had seen since mid-October of 1980.
Rather than have his career in the State’s second most powerful position end with a whimper, he would demonstrate for one last time why he has been called and will be called in posterity “the most intelligent legislator in California history.”
Nevertheless, the consideration for the life of his speakership played only a partial role in his not conceding the speakership to Republicans in December. If the Republicans, despite the numerical advantage, did not possess the intelligence to take the speakership, then perhaps they did not deserve it at that particular time and Willie served California’s best interest by holding it until it could be taken.
But underlying all else, while Willie served his own interests, his own interests were secondary to the interest of Democrats in the Assembly. Otherwise, he would not have been so unfailingly supported by the caucus. In January, he had been willing to endorse Republican Bernie Richter or another Democrat as speaker. In holding onto the speakership, he saved political careers, he saved staff and he protected the interests of the Democrats. If he had conceded in December or January, Republicans would have taken over, reassigning committee chairpersons, committee members, committee staff, and firing Democrat Members’ personal staff.
More than ego or vanity with reference to the speakership, Willie as leader was bound to pursue all possible measures necessary in order to protect Democrat interests, and as history has shown, he proved himself remarkably effective. Nonetheless, he was in a similar situation in May. If the Democrats wanted to endorse a compromise candidate, Willie’s vote would be needed to help elect the individual and possibly needed to keep the individual in power. In such a scenario, there would be no “sneaking out” of the Assembly altogether, and he knew this.
Therefore, I concluded that his “sneaking out” meant a drastic change in his role at the Capitol, perhaps an exit from leadership and policy-making roles. He said one last thing to me that week worthy of record. Smiling slightly, he said, “I’ve got one more trick up my sleeve for em” and left it at that. After over five years of studying his history, I believed I had finally begun to understand how Willie operated. Still, I could only guess about how he had written the final dramatic scene.
THE QUICKENING
In the last week, I realized I had guessed correctly, but not everyone saw what was coming. There was still talk of Brulte becoming speaker with the election of another Republican on June 5. Some suggested that Brulte should step aside and put Curt Pringle of Garden Grove up as a substitute candidate. One of the GOP freshmen even said he was “putting something together.”
Regardless of logic, rumors persisted that Willie Brown would be resigning from the Assembly completely. Meanwhile, Republican Larry Bowler of Elk Grove, conjunct with State Equalization Board Member Dean Andal of Stockton was working vigorously on a recall of Democrat Mike Machado, which was slated for August 22.
Machado had won the seat in the 17th Assembly District after Andal had vacated it to run for the Board. Had Andal remained in the Assembly (and he certainly would have regained his seat had he sought re-election), the Republicans would have finished with 42 seats, and there would have been no dispute over who would have been Speaker in December.
Also involved in the recall effort was wealthy businessman/Republican state senator Rob Hurtt of Garden Grove who believed that having a Republican Assembly Speaker would bolster his chances at becoming President Pro Tem of the Senate. From the eve of his election, conservative Hurtt, described by many a candidate “from the religious right,” suggested he would challenge the leadership of moderate Ken Maddy, Senate Republican Leader from Fresno.
Thursday, June 1st was touted as the last Assembly session day that Willie would preside over as Speaker, and once again the gallery was filled to capacity. Beyond the Capitol, thousands in the State watched the proceedings on the Capitol Channel provided by cable television. It was expected that he would step down on that day to announce his candidacy for Mayor of San Francisco on Saturday. It was a typical business day in the Assembly, and Willie’s handling of the well-oiled law-making machine at full-speed evidenced all the knowledge, experience and finesse he had gained in over fourteen years as master of the process.
However, he did not step down on June 1, though at one point it seemed he tried. Eventually the session ended, and Willie had left the Republicans, lobbyists, insiders and professional prognosticators wondering and guessing once again.
On Saturday morning, June 3, the sky was bright and blue over Japantown’s Peace Plaza in San Francisco. Hundreds of people had gathered there – the blacks, the whites, the browns, the Asians, the rich, the disenfranchised, the heterosexuals and the homosexuals – to hear Willie Brown announce his candidacy for mayor of what many there believed was “the greatest city in the world.” Placards had already been printed, emblazoned with the words “WILLIE BROWN FOR MAYOR,” and they were raised and waved about frantically as the anxious crowd waited for the candidate to take his place.
His appearance was signaled by frenzied applause, loud cries of support and a general uproar, which seemed to last two minutes before settling enough for him to begin. Standing above the crowd in a dark-blue pin-stripe suit, Willie proclaimed that the city of San Francisco absolutely needed “strong, new, vibrant, creative, risk-taking leadership,” and formally announcing his candidacy for mayor, asserted that he was the one candidate who would provide such leadership.
In a speech interrupted many times by cheers and loud clapping, Willie described for supporters and the world the circumstances which caused him to declare his candidacy for mayor, the challenges he and supporters would face in the coming election and the proposed goals of his mayorship. The following are brief excerpts from the oration:
It’s amazing how I’ve watched this city change in my 31 years. This city has gone from being occupied and led by people with great vision to being led by people who are simply caretakers…
I want to be your Mayor, and I can be your Mayor, but let me tell you – Don’t misread the times. It’s going to be really, really tough to elect me…
I have raised between 60 and 70 million dollars for peoples’ campaigns – not a nickel spent in San Francisco… I have literally, almost single-handedly, stayed the tide of right-wingism and kept the horrible people out, eliminated those who would do violence to good public policy, eliminated those who would desecrate the environment… I have done the job, and it has been costly personally… When you raise money (in the amount and manner I have), some people will wonder whether you still have a soul. I still have a soul!
It was at last official. Willie had indicated where he was going after the Assembly. Within the crowd there was a sense of ebullience and electricity, and I could feel it. He had spoken a phrase however, that stuck in my mind when he said, “It’s going to be really, really tough to elect me.”
A translation was necessary, and after thinking more, I arrived at this one: No one was going to “elect” Willie Brown as Mayor of San Francisco. If he was going to win the mayorship, it would be because he himself went out aggressively and won it.
He may have been indicating in the statement that he would have to work really, really hard to accomplish his goal, that rather than sitting back and letting other people manage and energize his campaign, he himself would lead the effort. For me there was no mistaking: once Willie Brown focused his immense intelligence on the Mayor’s race, and by intelligence I mean his own and the intelligence invested in his political machine – in the moment he decided that he would run for mayor, he knew he would almost certainly win the job.
But Willie was too experienced at elections and politics to show any great confidence. He would take nothing for granted. He would work harder than he had worked in years, shaking hands with the people of San Francisco and carefully addressing their concerns. Overconfident, he had been left disappointed in 1974 when he lost the speakership bid to Leo McCarthy. He had managed many races, he had seen strongly favored candidates run good campaigns, let up or screw up in the end, and lose to plotting and tenacious underdogs. Through intelligent planning, hard work and painstakingly garnered public support, Willie Brown would become the next Mayor of San Francisco. For all I have studied and learned about Willie, I would have bet my life on it.
BIRTH OF A SPEAKERSHIP
When the Assembly met at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, June 5, 1995, Willie Brown was not presiding. Instead, Joe Baca, Speaker pro Tempore of the Assembly, held the gavel at the rostrum. All 78 Members were present – the two vacant seats were those of Richard Mountjoy who had been ousted in late January and Ross Johnson who had moved over to the Senate in early May.
Having all Democrat Members present was no small feat as Martha Escutia of Huntington Park was pregnant with her first baby and due on June 15. Thus she was restricted from flying on commercial airlines. Because her vote in this specific session day was absolutely necessary, Willie made arrangements and had her flown up to Sacramento in a private jet just in time for the roll call.
This particular Monday was important because it was the last session day before a change in the numbers. In a special election in Assembly district 59 on Tuesday, June 6, another Republican would be elected so that by the next session day on Thursday, Republicans would outnumber Democrats 40-39. With Paul Horcher gone, no Republican would support a Democrat as speaker. Without a doubt, the Assembly would have a Republican speaker by the end of Thursday. At 10:16, merely 16 minutes after the session began, Speaker pro Tempore Baca declared the Assembly recessed so that the separate caucuses could meet. Monday, June 5th, was the last day for Willie to make a move, the last day for Willie to show what he had up his sleeve, and that he did.
FINAL PERFORMANCE
When the Assembly reconvened at 12:41, it was the Honorable Willie L. Brown, Jr., Speaker of the Assembly presiding for the last time in such a capacity. Moving briskly through business issues that included reference of bills to committees and first readings, the action quickly turned to nominations for Speaker of the Assembly whereby Democrat Member Grace Napolitano of Norwalk nominated Republican Doris Allen of Cypress for the office. A woman, Democrat Debra Bowen of Marina Del Rey who highlighted the fact that for a first time in California history, a woman could preside over the Assembly, seconded the nomination of a woman by a woman.
Quelling rumors that he had cast himself as a compromise candidate, Garden Grove Republican Curt Pringle nominated Jim Brulte for the office of speaker. Republican Fred Aguiar seconded this nomination, just as he had done in the previous two occasions for nominations. Immediately, and before their plan might unravel, the Democrats wanted to vote on the speakership issue, but the Republicans sought pause for recapitulation and strategy.
Willie’s plan became immediately clear when the roll was called for a Democrat motion that pressed for a vote. Doris Allen agreed with Democrats that a vote should be forthcoming. The demand for the previous question (the speakership vote) was sustained by a 39-38 margin. One Democrat, Curtis Tucker of Los Angeles was missing and did not vote.
Assuming the role of parliamentarian in the vacated place of Ross Johnson, Curt Pringle asked how the roll call would be processed, and Willie answered that it would be called orally “pursuant to the custom and precedent of the House.” Noting Tucker’s absence and the necessity of his vote in the plan, Byron Sher moved a call of the Assembly, which brought Tucker back into the chamber.
NEW RULES
Democrat Phil Isenberg next introduced new rules, which were to be substituted for the rules adopted in House Resolution No. 10 from the January 23 session day. These new rules were purposed to enhance the position of the minority party, strengthen the speaker, and they established a designation “Speaker Emeritus,” the description of which was worded as such:
“Any Member having served in the Assembly in the capacity of Speaker shall, subsequent to that service, be known as Speaker Emeritus, and may perform such functions and duties as assigned by the Speaker.”
The creation of such a new position was consistent with statements Willie had made in December relating to the Speaker and Committee Chairpersons “coaching” and “assisting” the heirs to their offices through a brief transition period, but the Republicans no doubt saw it as an attempt by Willie to put himself in a position in which he was still calling all the shots. Nonetheless it was useless to oppose the motion as Democrats and Republican Allen, on that day, had the numbers. When the roll was called after symbolic interference by Republicans, the new rules were adopted by a 40-38 margin.
A NEW SPEAKER, A NEW ERA
Circa 2:00 p.m., the Assembly finally voted to decide who would be the next speaker. Prior to the announcement of the result, Willie asked if any Member wished to change his or her vote. With no response, he announced the results:
For Assembly Member Doris Allen:
Assembly Members Allen, Alpert, Archie-Hudson, Baca, Bates, Bowen, Valerie Brown, Burton, Bustamante, Caldera, Campbell, Cannella, Cortese, Davis, Ducheny, Escutia, Figueroa, Friedman, Gallegos, Hannigan, Hauser, Isenberg, Katz, Knox, Kuehl, Lee, Machado, Martinez, Mazzoni, McDonald, Kevin Murray, Willard Murray, Napolitano, Sher, Speier, Sweeney, Tucker, Vasconcellos, Villaraigosa, and Willie Brown – 40
For Assembly Member Jim Brulte:
Assembly Members Aguiar, Alby, Baldwin, Battin, Boland, Bordonaro, Bowler, Brewer, Brulte, Conroy, Cunneen, Firestone, Frusetta, Goldsmith, Granlund, Harvey, Hawkins, Hoge, House, Kaloogian, Knight, Knowles, Kuykendall, McPherson, Miller, Morrissey, Morrow, Olberg, Poochigian, Pringle, Rainey, Richter, Rogan, Setencich, Takasugi, Thompson, Weggeland, and Woods – 38
Thus Willie Brown declared that Assembly Member Doris Allen had been the choice of the Assembly for the Office of Speaker for the 1995-96 Regular Session.
Speaker-elect Doris Allen was escorted to the rostrum by Democrat Members Speier, Escutia, Archie-Hudson, Alpert and Boland – all women Members. Newport Beach Republican Marilyn Brewer had been appointed as an escort by Willie, but she effused to participate.
After being presented to the House by Jackie Speier, the newly-appointed Speaker Doris Allen was administered the Oath of Office by chief clerk Dotson Wilson. Speaker Emeritus Willie Brown, presiding for the final minutes in the life of his speakership, adjourned the Assembly at 3:00 p.m.
THE FINAL CURTAIN
So there it was: having been master of the house for almost fifteen years, Willie Brown was no longer presiding Speaker for the California State Assembly, but as Speaker Emeritus he would retain a role in the governance of the House. With 39 solid Democrat votes, her own and possible support from a few in the Republican caucus, Doris Allen was set to be Speaker though 1995 and possibly into early1996.
The Machado recall, despite the passion of Republicans waging it, was likely to be unsuccessful. A Doris Allen recall would no doubt be launched, but Republican Allen, though her actions as Speaker, could greatly influence the outcome.
Willie Brown had been beaten in November elections and knew he would ultimately lose the speakership. What makes him especially memorable is the way that he played his hand: while he orchestrated betrayal and compromise, he never broke the rules; while he manipulated circumstances to preserve the place of the most experienced Member in the House, he never compromised the institution; while albeit he protected the Democrats, their staff and his own, he was equally dedicated to those few Republicans who were willing to work with him.
Willie Brown did not want to be out-voted in a speakership bid and dumped, he did not want to get evicted from his comfortable second-floor office by Republicans who had relished such an opportunity, he did not want to see long-time staffs given absolutely no consideration and fired. When in November Willie saw that Jim Brulte did not have 41 votes, he decided to fight for the Democrats, to fight for his own and Democrat staff, to fight for the dignity of his speakership.
Exactly seven months after the December 5 vote, in which Willie shrewdly denied the speakership to Jim Brulte, he willingly relinquished it to Republican Doris Allen, giving he his full support, his own vote and best wishes.
In what Democrats would perceive as poetic justice, when Willie resigned his office space to the new speaker, he was given Brulte’s newly decorated office space – the space occupied b the Minority Leader. Brulte was reassigned to the space previously occupied by who else? Paul Horcher.
As the gallery cleared, Willie still stood, proud, almost smirking. He had engineered events so that he spoke the final memorable lines.
Isn’t that incredible? And it’s not affirmative
action, not affirmative action at all. No assistance, no preference. The old
white boys got taken, fair and square!
[i] Bob Moretti, California 04/82, pg 99, Malan
[ii] Interview with Assembly Member Mike Cullen on 08/19/92
[iii] San Francisco Chronicle, 06/08/74, p1
[iv] The Washington Post, 12/21/90, pg A12, Cannon
[v] Interview with lobbyist Alice Huffman on 03/08/93, McGee
[vi] Interview with lobbyist John Mockler on 02/24/94, McGee
[vii] ibid
[viii] Casual interview with lobbyist in Frank Fats on 01/10/94, McGee
[ix] San Francisco Chronicle, 06/19/74, p7
[x] ibid
[xi] ibid
[xii] ibid
[xiii] San Francisco Chronicle, 06/19/74
[xiv] Interview with lobbyist John Mockler on 02/24/94, McGee
[xv]San Francisco Chronicle, 06/18/74
[xvi] ibid
[xvii] Interview with lobbyist John Mockler on 02/24/94, McGee
[xviii] San Francisco Chronicle, 06/08/74, p1
[xix] Interview with State Senator Ken Maddy on 04/28/93, McGee
[xx] ibid
[xxi] Interview with Assembly Member Frank Murphy on 01/10/93
[xxii] Interview with State Senator Ken Maddy on 04/28/93
[xxiii] ibid
[xxiv] San Francisco Examiner, 06/16/74
[xxv]San Francisco Chronicle, 06/11/74, p10
[xxvi] San Francisco Chronicle, 06/14/74, p16
[xxvii] California, 04/82, p99, Malan
[xxviii] Interview with State Senator Ken Maddy on 04/28/93, McGee
[xxix] Willie Brown, California 04/82, pg 99, Malan
[xxx] Willie Brown, Reflections, 1984, Willie Brown
[xxxi] Los Angeles, 02/81, p143
[xxxii] Sacramento Bee, 12/11/79, pA1
[xxxiii] Sacramento Bee, 12/18/79 pA18
[xxxiv] ibid
[xxxv] Sacramento Bee, 12/16/79 pA3
[xxxvi] Sacramento Bee, 12/21/79 pAA2
[xxxvii] ibid
[xxxviii] ibid
[xxxix] ibid
[xl] ibid
[xli] ibid
[xlii] Sacramento Bee, 01/01/80, pA1
[xliii] Sacramento Bee, 01/06/80, pA1
[xliv] Sacramento Bee, 01/01/80, pA1
[xlv] ibid
[xlvi] Sacramento Bee, 01/08/80, pA6
[xlvii] Sacramento Bee, 01/09/80, pA24
[xlviii] California, 04/82, p99, Malan
[xlix] Sacramento Bee, 12/02/80, pA16
[l] Sacramento Bee, 06/02/80, pA12
[li] Los Angeles, 02/81 p143
[lii] Sacramento Bee, 11/06/80, pA8
[liii] ibid
[liv] Sacramento Bee, 12/02/80, pA1
[lv] Sacramento Bee, 11/20/80, pA1
[lvi] Sacramento Bee, 11/21/80, pA8
[lvii] Sacramento Bee, 12/02/80, pA16
[lviii] California, 04/82, p140, Malan
[lix] Sacramento Bee, 12/02/80, pA16
[lx] Assembly Journal, 12/01/80
[lxi] San Jose Mercury News, 12/08/94, p6A
[lxii] Sacramento Bee, 02/05/95, Forum 1
[lxiii] San Jose Mercury News, 12/08/94, p6A
[lxiv] San Francisco Chronicle, 01/04/95, p1
[lxv] ibid
[lxvi] Sacramento Bee, 02/05/95, Forum p6
[lxvii] San Jose Mercury News, 12/08/94, p6A
[lxviii] San Francisco Chronicle, 01/04/95, p1
[lxix] ibid
[lxx] Sacramento Bee, 02/05/95, Forum p6
[lxxi] ibid
[lxxii] refers to editorial by Jacobs in Sacramento Bee, 02/05/95, Forum p6
[lxxiii] San Francisco Chronicle, 07/02/95, p3